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IN DISTRICT COURT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 














Case No. CR-2000-260 
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL 
FOR DEFENDANT 
Dale Carter Shackelford was formerly represented at public expense by 
Donald Ray Barker. The case has recently been remanded for a sentencing hearing 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515. Consequently, the defendant needs counsel to represent 
him. Good cause appearing, 
IT IS ORDERED that Donald Ray Barker is appointed to represent the 
defendant in this case. 
DATED this zg~y of March 2011. 
r~~ J~n R. Stegner 
District Judge 
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT - 1 
010 
OF.SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER APPOINTING COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT were delivered to 
following as indicated: 
·Donald Ray Barker 
PO Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
FAX: (208) 882-7604 
William Wofford Thompson 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613/ IMSI I Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
~U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[]Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[]U.S. Mail 
[] Hand Delivery 
,J}h::d Delivery 
~.S.Mail 
[] Hand Delivery 
[]Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 








John R. Stegner 
District Judge 


















Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: Z:3/2011-05-ll 
Time: 10:00 AM. 
Case No. CR-2000-00260 
APPEARANCES: 
William W. Thompson, ., Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendant not present, represented by 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID 
Subject of Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status 
review following the Supreme Court's filing of the Remittitur in this case, Court noted 
the presence of counsel and the absence of the defendant. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Thompson informed the Court that 
the State has not yet decided whether to seek the death penalty in this case, stating 
that the State was in the process of trying to locate potential witnesses. Mr. 
Thompson requested one month to make that decision. There being no objection from 
the defendant, Court so allowed, scheduling a further status conference in this case for 
3:00 P.M. on June 13, 2011. Court stated that it would expect the State to have made 
its decision of whether or not it intends to seek the death penalty by that date. 
Court informed Mr. Barker that it deemed it premature at this time to add 
second counsel for the defendant. Mr. Barker concurred. Court stated that it would 
revisit that matter ifthe State decides to seek the death penalty. Mr. Barker informed 
the Court that he had contacted Steve Mahaffy, second counsel during the trial of this 
case, as possibly serving as second counsel if the State decides to seek the death 
penalty. 




the release of copies of the Presentence Report both 
. Barker moved that a money judge be appointed. Court 
to prepare an . Mr. Thompson 
serve as money judge in this case. Colloquy was 
Court stated that it would contact Judge Kerrick to determine 
case. 
recessed at 10:08 AM. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 







LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208)883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
; 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 









Case No. CR-00-00260 
NOTICE OF STATE'S 
DECISION TO NOT SEEK 
DEATH PENALTY ON 
RESENTENCING 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and hereby gives notice to Court and counsel of its decision to not seek the death 
penalty at the resentencing on Counts I and II ordered by the Idaho Supreme Court in its 
substitute opinion dated June 1, 2010. 
On December 22, 2.000, following a jury trial that began the preceding October 16, 
defendant Dale Carter Shackelford was convicted by unanimous jury verdict of the 
following offenses: 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -1-
Count I - Murder in the First Degree of Donna Fontaine 
Count II- Murder in the First Degree of Fred Palahniuk 
Count III - Arson in the First Degree 
Count IV - Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree 
Count V - Conspiracy to Commit Arson in the First Degree 
Count VI - Preparing False Evidence 
Subsequently, in accordance with then-exi?ting law, the Honorable John R. Stegner, 
District Judge, imposed the death penalty on counts I and II. The Court also imposed the 
following sentences on the remaining counts: Arson in the First Degree - 25 years fixed 
(wit~out the possibility of parole); Conspiracy to Commit Murder in the First Degree -
fixed life (without the possibility of parole); Conspiracy to Commit Arson in the First 
Degree - 25 years fixed (without the possibility of parole); and Preparing False Evidence -5 
years fixed (without the possibility of parole). These sentences were handed down on 
. . 
October 25, 2001, following an additional six days of evidentiary hearing and substantial 
briefing, submission of exhibits and argument by counsel. 
The defendant then pursued post conviction and appellate relief culminating in the 
Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, substitute opinion upholding his convictions on all six 
counts, and upholding the sentences on counts III, IV, V and VI. However, the death 
sentences imposed in Counts I and II were set aside based on the intervening decision of 
the United States Supreme Courtin Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) which established 
a new requirement that a jury must find statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -2-
015 
reasonable doubt in order for the death penalty to be imposed. In applying the Ring 
decision retroactively to this case, the Idaho Supreme Court chose to reject the argument. 
that the original trial jury had already found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of two murders occurring at the same time (counts I and II), and remanded the case 
with a requirement that the State reprove that aggravating factor if it wished to continue 
pursuit of the death penalty. This, despite the trial and sentencing judge having previously 
determined that the jury verdicts on counts I and II "conclusively establishes this statutory 
aggravating factor." Findings of the Court in Considering Death Penalty, October 25, 2001, 
at 15 and 31. 
Although the Idaho legislature amended its death penalty statutes to conform to the 
new procedures required by the Ring decision, considered analysis of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's application of Ring in this case suggests that despite the Idaho legislature's 
determination that the death penalty is a viable and available sanction in appropriate cases, 
appellate courts will likely continue to effectively heighten the standards for effectuating a 
death sentence beyond the statutory requirements established by the legislature. Even 
more, the virtually endless post conviction and appellate review would likely continue to 
frustrate any reasonable possibility of honoring the intent of the Idaho legislature and the 
verdicts of a resentencing jury. 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -3-
.. 016 
Although it is, indeed, frustrating to the State, the survivingvictims and, possibly to 
some extent the Court itself, that despite us following the rule of law throughout the trial 
and first sentencing, appellate courts have seen fit to change the rules after the fact; that 
is the reality of the American criminal justice system and the State accepts it as such. 
In this case, the State is left with the unfortunate conclusion that it is unlikely a death 
penalty will be imposed in this case absent essentially re-trying the entire matter to a new 
jury. The State has exhaustively reviewed the Supreme Court's decision and the evidence 
that would have to be adduced to es9entially reprove counts I and II to a new jury. As part 
of this review, the State has undertaken locating witnesses from the original trial. 
Although most have been located, many of them reside out of state and as far away as the 
eastern United States. To reproduce all of these witnesses would necessarily involve 
substantial effort, the cooperation of the Courts of other jurisdictions to compel their 
attendance, and the incurring of substantial public expense for the witnesses to repeat 
testimony already given in a lengthy trial that led to unanimous jury verdicts of guilt. 
The State has also contacted various individuals including the original prosecutors, 
key law enforcement investigative personnel and the dedicated staff of the Capital Crimes 
Division of the Idaho Attorney General's Office; and the State has solicited input from the 
living victims - the survivors of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk. 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -4-
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In addition, there are practical considerations that include a County Prosecutor's 
fiscal responsibility obligations. Contrary to popular misconceptions (frequently touted by 
some Courts and defense couriset among others), the State does not have the benefit of 
unlimited resources at its disposal. In fact, in many instances it appears that Court 
appointed defense counsel have much more ready access to judicial authorizations to 
spend public monies - unfettered by any direct responsibility to the tax payers. Although 
fiscal ramifications most certainly do not and should not control a prosecutorial decision, 
consideration of them is inherently necessary in making a reasoned and responsible 
decis.ion. 
Above all, the primary goal of the criminal justice system, and the duty of law 
enforcement and prosecutors, is the good order and protection of society. In the current 
case, the defendant is already serving a fixed life sentence without the possibility of parole 
· on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder charge (count IV), and that conviction 
and sentence have been sustained through the appellate process. Absent some gross 
· dereliction by the Idaho Department of Correction which would allow the defendant to 
escape custody (highly unlikely), society is essentially protected from Dale Carter 
Shackelford forever. 
Consequently, the State has determined that the overriding goal of the Idaho 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESEJ\TTENCING: Page -5-
. 018 
Criminal Justice System (protection of society) can most likely and best be accomplished in 
this case by insuring the defendant spends the rest of his natural life in prison and, at the 
same time, avoiding the wasteful and costly repetition of a lengthy and complex trial and 
the interminable delays and lack of closure resulting from capital sentence reviews and 
appeals. For all of these reasons, the State hereby gives notice that it elects to not seek the 
death penalty at resentencing on either count I or count II, and based on the entire record 
in this case, including the trial testimony and original sentencing proceedings, and such 
further proceedings as the Court deems proper, respectfully prays that the Court impose 
consecutive sentences of fixed life on each count. -J__ . 
Respectfully submitted this 2.b day of June, 2011. 
Willlam W. Thom~s01\Jr. 
Prosecuting Atton1~ 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING: Page -6-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
_I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek the Death Penalty on Resentencing was: 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
/sent by facsimile - 882-7604 
to the following: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this JO't-h day of June, 2011. 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 




John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: June 20, 2011 







Time: 3:05 P.M. 
Case No. CR-2000-00260 
APPEARANCES: 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 










Defendant not present, represented by 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID 
----------~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject of Proceedings: STATUS CONFERENCE 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status 
conference in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the absence of the 
defendant. 
Court noted for the record that the State has filed a Notice of State's Decision to 
Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing. 
In response to inquiries from the Court, Mr. Barker stated that he is meeting 
with the defendant this week and requested that the Court fix another status 
conference in about week to schedule a date for resentencing. 
Court scheduling another status conference for 9:00 AM. on July 1, 2011, at 
which time a date for resentencing will be set. 
Mr. Thompson stated had spoken to legal counsel for the Idaho State Board of 












had no objection. 





D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CR-00-00260 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
of record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for an order disqualifying the Honorable 
Judge John R. Stegner without cause pursuant to Rule 25(a) Idaho Criminal Rules. 
Motion Disqualify Judge 
Without Cause - 1. 
D. Ray ~rker 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thei<;l-.,16(~ay of June, 2011, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the 
office of or serving by facsimile: 
William C. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] · First-class mail 
f<l Hand-delivered 
[ 1 Facsimile 
D. Ray 8cyl<er -- . 
Attorney et Law 
Motion Disqualify Judge 
Without Cause - 2 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208)883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 










Case No. CR-00-00260 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
JUDGE WITHOUT CA USE1' 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and objects to the defendant's 11Motion to Disqualify Judge without Cause" filed 
herein on June 22, 2011. 
The defendant, by his said motion, seeks an order pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
25(a) to disqualify the Honorable John R. Stegner without cause. Idaho Criminal Rule 
25(a)(2) provides: 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUTCAUSE": Page-1-
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"A motion for disqualification without cause must be filed not later than 
seven (7) days after service of a written notice setting the action for status 
conference, pre-trial conference, trial or for hearing on the first contested 
motion, or not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of a written 
notice specifying who the presiding judge or magistrate to the action will 
be, whichever occurs first; and such motion must be filed before the 
commencement of a status conference, a pre-trial conference, a contested 
proceeding or trial in the action. 11 
Following numerous pre-trfal proceedings and contested motions, this case went 
to trial on October 16, 2000, culminating in jury verdicts on December 221 2000. The 
case subsequently has undergone post-conviction scrutiny and appellate scrutiny 
resulting in the Idaho Supreme Court's substitute opinion dated June 11 2010, upholding 
the defendant's convictions on all six felony counts, and upholding the sentences on 
counts III, IV, V and VI. The case has now been remanded to the District Court for 
resentencing on counts I and II. Throughout this time, the Honorable John R. Stegner 
has been the presiding District Judge. Although the case has been remanded for 
resentencing on counts I and II, Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a)(5) specifically states that "a 
remand of a case for sentencing or resentencing does not reinstate the right to one 
disqualification without cause under this subparagraph (which allows an additional 
disqualification without cause in the event a new trial is ordered)." 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE": Page -2-
2"6 
Based on the above, the defendant's June 22, 2011, "Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Without Cause" is untimely and should be denied. 
Dated this 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE": Page -3-
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Defendant's "Motion To Disqualify Judge Without Cause" was: 
__ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
/_, 
~/ sent by facsimile - 882-7604 
to the following: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this .• ;i?>'d day of June, 2011. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
"MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE": Page -4-
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THE DISTRICT COURT 
THE OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant. 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 










Case No. CR-2000-260 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE 
~~~~~~~~~) 
This case, consisting of six criminal counts against the defendant, Dale 
Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), began in 2000. It proceeded through trial, 
sentencing, and post-conviction review. An appeal was heard by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. · The case has now been remanded to this Court for resentencing on two 
counts of first degree murder. On remand, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify 
Judge Without Cause pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 25(a). 
"Idaho Criminal Rule 25(a) provides that each party in a criminal action has 
a right to disqualify one judge without cause, provided the moving party complies 
with the procedures set forth in the rule." State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE Page 1 
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P.2d 625, 627 (1997). According to I.C.R. Rule 25(a)(5), this right is reinstated if a 
new trial is ordered but "a remand of a case for sentencing or resentencing does not 
reinstate the right to one disqualification without cause .... " In Larios, the court 
reasoned that a sentencing is simply "an ongoing part of the original proceeding" 
and that "no right of automatic disqualification" is reinstated upon remand for such 
a proceeding. 129 Idaho at 633, 931 P.2d at 627. 
Because this case has been remanded to this Court for resentencing, the 
defendant has no right to automatic disqualification. As a result, it is ORDERED 
that Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge Without Cause is DENIED. 
DATED this 3o~ay of June 2011. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE Page 2 
~Y\Q~ 
Jo~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
were delivered to the following as indicated: 
Donald Ray Barker 
PO Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
FAX: (208) 882-7604 
William Wofford Thompson Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613/ IMSI I Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
[]U.S. Mail 




[ ] Hand Delivery 
[]Fax 
H Hand Delivery 
[..-]U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[]Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
U
'\ 
On this day of June 2011. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
WITHOUT CAUSE 

















William W. Thompson, Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 










Subject of Proceedings: 
Defendant not present, represented by 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a status 
conference in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the absence of the 
defendant. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, Mr. Thompson stated that counsel are 
prepared to have the resentencing scheduled. Mr. Thompson requested that the Court 
order an update to the Presentence Report. 
Mr. Barker requested that this sentencing be delayed six months and argued in 
support of that. Mr. Barker moved that the defendant be transported to the facility in 
Orofino to give him better access. Court stated that it does not have the authority to 
order the Idaho State Board of Correction where to house the defendant. 
Court ordered that an update to the Presentence Report be completed by the 
Department of Correction and report filed with the Court and served upon counsel no 
later than August 5, 2011. If the defendant intends to offer any testimony or other 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
032 
evidence 
Barker shall so 
August 12, 2011. 
the information 
State and the 
Presentence Report, 
5:00 on 
response to inquiry the counsel had objection to 
conducting this hearing at the state facillty in Boise. Court scheduled resentencing for 
9:00 A.M. on August 26, 2011, at the state facility Boise. 
Court stated 
penitentiary in Boise. 
it would make 
Court recessed 9: 12 A.M. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 





courtroom at the 
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF AND THE COUNTY OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) .Case No. CR-2000-260 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER FOR UPDATE TO 
vs. ) PRESENTENCE REPORT 
) 
) 




It is ORDERED that an update to the Presentence Report shall be prepared by 
the Department .of Correction of the State of Idaho and ~hall be filed with the clerk of 
the above entitled Court not later than, August 5, 2011, together with two (2) copies 
of the report - one of which shall be delivered by the clerk to the Latah County 
Prosecuting Attorney and the other of which shall be delivered by the clerk to defense 
counsel; and 
In the event defendant desires to rebut or explain any information contained in 
the update to' the presentence investigation report, his counsel shall, no later than 
5:00 P.M. on August 12, 2011, file with the clerk of the court a written notice setting 
forth with particularity those portions of the presentence investigation report which 
defendant intends to rebut or explain and shall concurrently serve a copy upon the 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney. 
DATED this {Z ~of July 2011. 
~~C)~ 
Joh R. Stegner 
District Judge 
'"" ... "'~.LA,.., FOR UPDATE TO PRESENTENCE REPORT - 1 0 3 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true 
complete and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER was transmitted by facsimile to: 
D. RAY BARKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
882-7604 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION 
PO BOX1408 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
208-799-8556 
and hand delivered to: 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
. Prosecuting Attorney 
on this _/L~y of July 201 
ORDER FOR UPDATE TO PRESENTENCE REPORT - 2 035 
D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 









Case No. CR-00-00260 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
NOTICE OF STATE'S DECISION 
TO NOT SEEK DEATH PENAL TY 
ON RESENTENCING 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
of record, D. Ray Barker, and responds to the Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek 
Death Penalty on Resentencing, filed herein on June 20, 2011. 
Idaho Code 19-2515(5)(a) provides as follows: 
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, 
whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a 
jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and 
a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and 
served as provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, a 
special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 1 
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purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of 
counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense ... The 
special sentencing procedure shall be conducted before a 
jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney. 
In this case, Mr. Shackelford was adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree 
and a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in 
Section 18-4004A. Therefore, a special sentencing proceeding should be held for the 
purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and 
mitigation of the offense and the special sentencing proceeding should be conducted 
before a jury unless a jury is waived by the Defendant with the consent of the 
prosecuting attorneys. The Defendant has not waived a jury. 
The State, by filing the Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing on June 20, 2011, has attempted to undo or remove the effects of its prior 
filing of a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty. Pursuant to Idaho Code 18-4004 
A, a notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be withdrawn at any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence. Dale Shackelford has now been in prison on death row in 
excess of ten years. It is difficult to conclude that his sentence has no,t already been 
imposed. 
The Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing was 
filed long after the imposition of sentence. Whether or not the State can undo or 
reverse the effect of the filing of the Notice to Seek the Death Penalty does not resolve 
the real issue which is whether the court can make factual findings that have the effect 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 2 
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of increasing a sentence which may be imposed on Mr. Shackelford. Subsections a, b, 
and c of Idaho Code 19-2515(7) provide as follows: 
The jury shall be informed as follows: 
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance 
exists and no mitigating circumstances exist which would 
make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the 
defendant will be sentenced to death by the court. 
(b) If the jury finds the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance but finds that the existence of 
mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death 
penalty unjust or the jury cannot unanimously agree on 
whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be 
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole; and 
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance or if the jury cannot unanimously 
agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating 
circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the court 
to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less 
than ten (10) years. 
Subsection (b) requires a finding of a statutory aggravating circumstances and 
requires a weighing of that aggravating circumstance against any mitigating 
circumstances and provides that if the mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of 
the death penalty unjust, or the jury can't agree that the mitigating circumstances make 
the imposition of the death sentence unjust, the Defendant will be sentenced to a term 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Subsection (c) provides that if the 
jury does not unanimously find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, 
then the Defendant will be sentenced by the Court to a term of life imprisonment with a 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 3 
38 
fixed term of not less than ten (10) years. The state in its Notice of Decision Not to 
Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing states that it respectfully prays that the court 
impose consecutive sentences of fixed life on each count. A sentence of fixed life is the 
equivalent of a term of life without the possibility of parole. 
The requirement that a jury must find a statutory aggravating circumstance in 
order to impose a sentence of life without parole also appears in Idaho Code § 18-4004, 
which provide as follows: 
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but 
finds that the imposition of the death penalty would be 
unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. If a jury, 
or the court if the jury is waived, does not find a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if 
the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life 
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less 
than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the 
offender shall not be eligible for parole or discharge or credit 
or deduction of sentence for good conduct, except for 
meritorious service. 
The above quoted statute makes it clear that a jury, unless waived, must make 
. the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance in order for the court to impose a 
fixed life sentence. It is also clear that if a jury does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of 
confinement of not less than ten ( 10) years. 
The reason this case was remanded was that due to the decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Ring v. Arizona, 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 4 
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536 U.S. 584 (2002), which require that any factual findings that are necessary to 
enhance a sentence must be findings made by a jury. A trial judge is no longer able to 
make such factual findings. 
Subsection (b) of Idaho Code Section 19-2515(7) require a factual finding of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance in order to impose a sentence of fixed life or life 
without the possibility of parole. 
The case of Blakely v. Washington 542 U.S. 296 (2004) is illustrative of the issue 
presented in this case. In Blakely, the Defendant plead guilty and admitted the 
elements of second degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a 
firearm but he admitted no other relevant facts. The standard range for the offense 
under the Washington Sentencing Reform Act was 49 to 53 months. Under that Act, a 
judge may impose a sentence above the standard range if he finds "substantial and 
compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." The Act lists aggravating 
factors that justify such a departure. When a judge imposes an exceptional sentence 
he must set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting it. In Blakely, the 
trial Judge imposed a sentence of 90 months - 37 months beyond the standard 
maximum and justified the sentence on the ground that Petitioner had acted with 
"deliberate cruelty." 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the case required the application of the rule 
expressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). ·"Other than the fact of 
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 5 
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statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." The State contended there was no Apprendi violation because the sentence 
was within the 10 years maximum for a Class B felony. The Court stated that its 
precedents makes clear that the "statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury 
verdict or admitted by the Defendant. 
In this case, the jury verdict reflected no facts other than guilt, therefore the Court 
can sentence Mr. Shackelford to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less 
than ten (10) years pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2515(7)(c) but the Court cannot 
sentence Mr. Shackelford to life without the possibility of parole (fixed life) unless the 
factual finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance is submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
DATED this ,2 ff4 day of 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 6 
tP1-: '2011. 
g)~&-Le 
D. Ray Bapt<er 
Attorney (or Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2sf4day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed 
to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or 
serving by facsimile: 
William C. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 






D. Ray B~ er 
Attorney at Law 
Defendant's Response to Notice of State's 
· Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on 
Resentencing - 7 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 











Case No. CR-2000-260 
ORDER SCHEDULING 
RESENTENCING 
It is ORDERED that the resentencing hearing in the above captioned case will 
be1 conducted at the Clearwater County Courthouse commencing at 10:00 A.M. on 
August 26, 2011. f"-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true 
complete and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER SCHEDULING RESENTENCING 
was transmitted by facsimile to: 
D. RAY BARKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
882-7604 
and hand delivered to: 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
on this 2ffay of July 20 . 
~ 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTORS OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
Phone: (208)883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 










Case No. CR-00-00260 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S 
RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF 
STATE'S DECISION TO NOT 
SEEK DEATH PENALTY ON 
RESENTENCING" 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and respectfully submits the following reply to the "Defendant's Response to 
Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing" filed herein on July 
25, 2011. 
The defendant attempts to argue that this Court is without the power to impose a 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE 
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -1-
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unified sentence of a maximum indeterminate life sentence and a fixed minimum period of 
confinement of life, arguing that Idaho Code 19-2515 (as it currently exists) requires that a 
jury find a statutory aggravating factor before a court can impose a "fixed life11 sentence. 
The defendant's reliance on this statute is misplaced. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
observed in Booth v. State, Docket number 37296, June 29, 2011, (attached) Idaho Code 19-
2515 (and 19-2515A which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on mentally 
retarded persons) 11are only applicable in capital cases." Id. at p.9. As the Supreme Court 
further observed, "(t)hese statutory sections make clear that the provision in LC.§ 18-4004 
requiring the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a first-
degree murder conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is 
sought." at 10. 
The only effect of Idaho Code 19-2515 is to require a mandatory fixed life sentence if 
a death penalty is sought and an aggravated circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but the death penalty is not imposed. The statute does not change the court's 
authority to impose, in its discretion, a fixed period of confinement up to life imprisonment 
pursuant to Idaho Code 19-2513and18-4004 in a case where the death penalty is not being 
sought. 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE 
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -2-
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Idaho Code 18-4004 sets forth the minimum sentence for first degree murder: 11a life 
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years ... 11 • It does 
not establish a cap on the fixed period of confinement. This is cons_istent with Idaho Code 
19-2513, which provides "that the aggregate sentence shall not exceed the maximum 
provided by law." As the Idaho Supreme Court observed in State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676 
(1984), citing to State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506 (1984), "if a sentence of imprisonment is 
imposed for murder in the first degree it must be for life, although it may be either an 
indeterminate life sentence or a fixed life sentence." at 680. 
The State has elected to not seek the death penalty at the upcoming resentencing. 
Consequently, Idaho Code 19-2515 does not apply and the court has the legal authority to 
impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of life under Idaho Code 19-
2513 and 18-8004. 
The defendant's reliance on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), is also 
misplaced. In Blakely, Washington state law provided for a specific sentencing range for 
the underlying offense and required additional "substantial and compelling reasons" to 
justify a sentence above the standard range. Idaho does not have a similar mandatory 
sentencing range, nor does it have a statutory requirement for aggravating factors to 
increase a sentence that is otherwise within the maximum range provided by statute. 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE 
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -3-
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Based on the above, the State respectfully prays that the Court, at the conclusion of 
the resentencing hearing herein, impose consecutive life sentences with minimum periods 
of confinement of life on each count of first degree murder. 
REPLY TO "DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE 
OF STATE'S DECISION TO NOT SEEK DEATH 
PENALTY ON RESENTENCING:" Page -4-
Wi liam W. Thomp~ 
Prosecuting Attorne 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to "Defendant's 
Response to Notice of State's Decision to Not Seek the Death Penalty on Resentencing" was: 
__ . mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile - 882-7604 
to the following: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dated this 15 t- day of August, 2011. 
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THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE 
Docket No. 37296 
JAMES BOOTH, 
Petitioner-Respondent, Boise, 2011 
v, 2011 Opinion No. 78 











Filed: June 29, 2011 
Respondent-Appellant. $tephen W. Kenyon, 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third· Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. The Honorable Gregory Culet, District Judge. 
The district court's order, granting post-conviction relief, is affirmed. 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant Kenneth 
K. Jorgensen argued. 
Law Offices of Van G. Bishop, Nampa, for respondent. Van G. Bishop argued. 
J. JONES, Justice. 
The State ofidaho appeals the district court's order granting Trevor Booth's petition for 
post-conviction relief on the ground that Booth received ineffective assistance of counsel. We 
affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died .as a result of multiple gunshot wounds that he 
sustained at his residence. After an investigation, law enforcement suspected that Trevor Booth 
was responsible for the shooting. Law enforcement based this conclusion on several pieces of 
evidence obtained during the investigation. First, law enforcement determined that the perpetrator 
had entered Kellum's residence through the back door and shot him five times using an improvised 
silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle. Law enforcement found a single set of footprints leading 
1 
05·0 
from the back door of Kellum's residence to the street, where neighbors said a black pickup truck 
was parked at the time of the shooting. Booth, who owned a black pickup truck, told law 
enforcement that he had driven to Kellum's residence on the morning Kellum was shot to pick up 
marijuana that he planned to sell. Booth claimed he parked his pickup truck on the street and 
approached the front door of the residence where he heard screaming and gunshots. Booth told law 
enforcement that he left the residence after hearing the shots. However, before Kellum passed 
away, he was transported to the hospital where he identified Booth as the person who had shot him. 
Booth was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, and was represented by Richard 
Harris. Although the crime of first-degree murder carries a potential penalty of death, 1 the State 
declined to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, thereby establishing that Booth's case 
was a non-capital case. 2 During the time the case was pending, Harris met with Booth periodically 
to discuss Booth's version of the events leading up to Kellum's death. Although Booth initially 
maintained that he did not commit the offense, he eventually acknowledged that he killed Kellum, 
but asserted he did so in order to defend himself and his family. Booth told Harris that he was 
actively involved in selling controlled substances and Kellum was his supplier. Booth explained 
that he eventually fell behind in paying Kellum for the drugs he had supplied, and Kellum began 
making threats of physical violence towards Booth, his family, and his girlfriend if he did not pay 
the money owed. 
Prior to trial, Gearld Wolff, the prosecutor handling Booth's case, informed Harris that he 
intended to file a motion requesting that the Court provide a special verdict form to be used by the 
jury if Booth was convicted of first-degree murder. Specifically, the proposed verdict form would 
instruct the jury to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances delineated in I.C. 
§ 19-2515(9)3 existed, including whether (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, . 
manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its 
1 According to I.C. § 19-2515(1), 
Except as provided in section 19-2515A, Idaho Code, a person convicted of murder in the first 
degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a 
killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person 
·ctirectly committed the acts that caused death. 
All statutory citations in this opinion will refer to those in effect at the time that Booth's criminal case was pending. 
2 Pursuant to LC.§ 19-2515(3)(a), a defendant convicted of a crime that is punishable by death cannot be sentenced 
to death unless the State files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 
3I.C. § 19-2515(9) sets forth the list of statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt, before a sentence of death can be imposed. 
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commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life; or (3) the defendant, by prior 
conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit 
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. Wolff communicated to 
Harris his understanding that pursuant to LC. § 18-4004, the statute dealing with the penalties for 
first-degree murder, the State could seek an instruction regarding statutory aggravating 
circumstances even in a non-capital case. LC. § 18-4004 4 provides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and l 9-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. 
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the 
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not 
less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not 
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct, except for meritorious service .. Every person guilty of murder of the 
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life. 
Wolff interpreted this statute to mean that if the jury were to find any statutory aggravating 
circumstances in a non-capital case, the court would then be required to impose a fixed life 
sentence. 
After examining the statute, Harris agreed with Wolff's interpretation and believed Booth 
would be subject to a fixed life sentence if the jury were to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
statutory aggravating circumstance existed. Harris and Wolff subsequently met with the district 
court judge prior to the scheduled pretrial conference to discuss the State's intent to request the 
special verdict form. During this meeting, the parties discussed Wolff and Harris's mutual 
understanding of LC. § 18-4004. The judge informed Wolff and Harris that the court would likely 
4 LC. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 were amended in 2003 to reflect the requirement established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that a jury, rather than a judge, find the necessary statutory 




use the special verdict form if it was requested by the State and supported by the evidence. 
Thereafter, Harris prepared a memorandum to Booth outlining his understanding of the 
potential penalties if Booth were to be convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In the 
memorandum, Harris set forth the text ofI.C. § 18-4004 and explained that, 
Wbat this statute means is that upon a conviction for first degree murder, if the jury 
or judge if [a] jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt[,] the sentence is death. However, if the prosecutor does not seek 
death, as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, then 
the sentence is a fixed life sentence. That means the person sentenced will spend his 
life in prison and will die there. At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge 
indicated to the prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury 
that will ask the question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of first 
degree murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also contain the same question 
for second degree murder and for manslaughter. If the jury finds you guilty of first 
degree murder, the verdict form will contain the further question for the jury: "do 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or 
No." Since the trial judge intends to submit the question to the jury as part of the 
verdict form and if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance as part of the 
verdict, then the sentence to be imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the 
evidence there is in mitigation, [is] a fixed life sentence which means you will 
spend the rest of your life in prison. 
The memorandum goes on to explain what statutory aggravating circumstances the State intended 
to prove. Harris mentioned that in his experience, "it is not too difficult for a finding to be made 
that a murder is heinous (a murder by definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or 
alternatively that by committing the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life." Harris 
also described, in detail, all of the State's evidence against Booth, and explained "based upon the 
evidence as currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the jury is going to return a 
verdict of guilty." Finally, Harris advised Booth that his best option was to consider entering into a 
plea agreement with the State. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability of 
facing a fixed life sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. If 
you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated circumstances, 
or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances, then you would face 
a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever greater period the 
judge[] might· impose. I have indicated above I do not think the Judge would 
impose a term greater tha[n] fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in 
that context means thirty years. My recommendation is because of the strong risk of 
spendirig the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be your best option. 
After giving the memorandum to Booth, Harris met with Booth's family members to 
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explain and discuss the memorandum. Harris discussed with Booth's family the nuances of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. During 
this time, Harris continued to negotiate with Wolff regarding a potential plea agreement. 
Booth subsequently entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the 
plea agreement, Booth agreed tO plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for the State's 
agreement not to pursue statutory aggravating circumstances as part of sentencing. The Rule 11 
agreement was filed with the court on June 9, 2005, and Booth entered a plea of guilty on the same 
day. After holding a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Booth to an indeterminate life 
sentence with thirty years fixed. 
\ 
After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, 5 Booth timely filed a petition for post-
conviction relief. The court dismissed all of Booth's allegations in support of his petition upon the 
State's motion for summary dismissal, except for his allegations that (1) Harris used coercive and 
threatening tactics to get him to plead guilty by assuring him and his family that he would receive a 
ten year fixed sentence if he pleaded guilty and a fixed life sentence ifhe took the case to trial; and 
(2) Harris used the sentencing memorandum to coerce him into pleading guilty and was not 
adequately prepared to go to trial even though Booth felt he "had nothing to loose [sic] by going to 
trial." 
After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that Harris' 
representation of Booth fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because· Harris 
erroneously advised Booth that he would be subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to 
trial and the State's special verdict fonn was presented to the jury. According to the district court, 
LC. § 18-4004 clearly indicates that if Booth's case had gone to trial, and the jury had found an 
aggravating circumstance, such a finding would "merely have been advisory in nature and the 
court would not have been mandated to sentence Booth to a fixed life term, but would actually 
have been bound only to sentence within the parameters of a life sentence, with any fixed portion 
above ten years .... "The court also determined that there was a reasonable probability that but for 
Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have proceeded to trial. Therefore, the district court granted Booth's petition for post-conviction 
relief and ordered his guilty plea to be withdrawn and the case set for jury trial. The State timely 
5 Booth appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, where his sentence was affirmed. 
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appealed to this Court. 
II. 
Issue on Appeal 
I. Whether the district court erred in granting Booth's petition for post-conviction relief 
on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
III. 
Discussion 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for post-conviction 
relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the district court's factual 
. findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Murray, 121Idaho918, 921, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921, 828 P.2d at 1326; Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). When faced with a mixed question of fact and law, the. Court will defer 
to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free 
review over the application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921-22, 828 
P.2d at 1326-27. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho 
State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure 
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance. 
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 
Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This Court applies the 
Stricklmyd test when determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the plea process. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463. Before deciding 
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010). In this case, we conclude that the district 
court did not err in determining that Harris' representation of Booth during the plea process was 
deficient and that Booth was prejudiced as a result of such deficiency. 
6 ' 
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1. Deficient Performance 
On appeal, the State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating Harris' 
performance was deficient because, even though the court ultimately concluded that Harris' 
interpretation of LC .. § 18-4004 was incorrect, his interpretation was nevertheless objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances. According to the State, the reasonableness of Harris' 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the prosecutor also believed that the statute would 
require the court to impose a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury found a statutory 
aggravating circumstance. The State further argues that the district court also appeared to agree 
with Harris' interpretation, given that it intended to provide the jury with a special verdict form 
instructing them to consider whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven. 
Lastly, the State contends that Harris' memorandum demonstrates that Harris had carefully 
reviewed the facts of the case, the . evidence that would likely be admitted at trial, and the 
applicable law, before advising Booth that his best option was to enter a plea of guilty and, 
therefore, Harris' representation of Booth was not deficient. 
In order to demonstrate the attorney's performance was deficient, the defendant has the 
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. In doing so, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
was competent and diligent in his or her representation of the defendant. Schoger v. State, 148 
Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). Furthermore, "tactical or strategic decisions of trial 
c~rnnsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 234, 880 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct .App. 1994). "Where a defendant is 
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the 
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 
P.3d 376, 386 (2004) .. Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a 
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. 
Id 
Although it appears that this Court has never dealt with .the precise issue of whether a 
defense attorney's erroneous interpretation of a sentencing statute constitutes deficient 
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performance, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when a statute 
unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an attorney has a duty to provide correct advice 
regarding such penalty. For example,. in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that an attorney 
engaged in deficient performance by failing to advise the defendant that his plea of guilty to drug 
distribution made him. subject to automatic deportation because the consequences of the 
defendant's guilty plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute. 130 S. Ct. at 
1483. The Court reasoned that, 
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, 
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's 
conviction .... Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would 
make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, 
which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically 
commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most 
trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him 
false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this 
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of 
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his 
deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. 
Id (internal citations omitted). Although the Court recognized that an attorney engages m 
deficient performance by rendering advice that is inconsistent with the clear provisions of a 
statute, the Court was careful to recognize that the result would not be the same where the law is 
not as clear. 
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the 
deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of 
the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct 
and straightforward ... , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise 
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is tnily clear, 
as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. 
Id Therefore, an attorney engages in deficient performance by rendering advice regarding 
potential penalties during the plea process that is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous 
provisions of a sentencing statute. See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 422 ("The mere inaccuracy 
of a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance, but a 
gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome, combined with erroneous advice on the possible 
effects of going to trial, falls below the required level of competence.") 
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In this case, the district court did not err in finding that Harris' performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness due to his erroneous advice regarding the potential penalty 
Booth would face if convicted at trial. Harris' interpretation of I.C. § 18-4004 is contrary to the 
plain and unambiguous language of the statute. I.C. § 18-4004 specifically provides that in first-
degree murder cases, "if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence 
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years." The language of the 
statute makes it clear that in cases where the State chooses not to seek the death penalty, the 
court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten years fixed. 
It appears that Harris based his interpretation on the first part of I.C. § 18-4004, which . . . ' 
provides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment .for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death p,enalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence. 
I.C. § 18-4004. However, Harris' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of this portion 
of the statute as well. First and foremost, LC. § 18-4004 specifically references I.C. §§ 19-2515 
and 19-2515A, which are both statutes that are only applicable in capital cases. LC.§ 19-2515A 
prohibits the court from imposing the death penalty against a "mentally retarded person." LC. § 
19-2515A. Furthermore, LC. § 19-2515 Syts forth the procedures for holding a· special sentencing 
proceeding in capital cases6 and articulates the instructions to be given to the jury during these 
proceedings. 7 Finally, LC. § 19-2515(9) goes on to lay out the various statutory aggravating 
6 I.C. § 19-2515(5) provides, 
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of 
guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Id,aho Code, 
a special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant 
evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense .... The special 
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant 
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney. 
7 According to I.C. § 19-2515(7), 
The jury shall be informed as follows: 
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circumstances that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the imposition 
of the death penalty. LC. § 19-2515(9). The lead-in to subsection 9 states, "[t]he following are 
statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed." I.C. § 19-2515(9) (emphasis 
added). 
These statutory sections make clear that the provision in LC .. § 18-4004 requiring the 
jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a first-degree murder 
conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is sought. Under the 
statutory scheme, the court is only required to impose a fixed life sentence when (1) the State has 
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty; (2) the State seeks the death penalty; (3) the 
defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, first-degree murder; (4) a special sentencing 
proceeding is held during which the jury,. or the court if a jury is waived, determines that at least 
one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) after 
weighing any mitigating evidence against the statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury, or 
the court if a jury is waived, finds that imposition of the death penalty is unjust. It is clear from 
the relevant statutes that statutory aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death 
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to 
trial and was convicted of first-degree murder, he would have been subject to an indeterminate 
life sentence with at least ten years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence, as Harris 
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no mitigating 
circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant 
will be sentenced to death by the court. 
(b) ·If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds that the 
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury 
cannot· unanimously agree on ·whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and 
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury 
cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant 
will be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten 




Given that the information Harris provided when advising Booth to plead guilty to first-
degree murder was based on a blatantly erroneous reading of the sentencing statutes, the district 
court did not err in determining that Harris' performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Just as in Padilla, the potential penalties in Idaho for first-degree murder in a 
non-capital case are clear from the statute and, therefore, Harris' duty to give correct advice in 
that regard is equally clear. It cannot be said that Booth's plea was entered voluntarily when 
Harris' advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60, 106 P.3d at 386. 
Moreover, the State's argument that Harris' interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was 
reasonable because the district judge and the prosecutor appeared to share the same interpretation 
is without merit. Just because other parties shared Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute 
does not mean Harris' interpretation was reasonable, given that such an interpretation is contrary 
to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Therefore, we find that Booth met his 
burden of demonstrating that Harris' performance was deficient. 
2. Prejudice 
The State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced 
by Harris' allegedly deficient performance because, even if Booth had insisted on going to trial, 
he would have still been subject to the same penalty as when he pleaded guilty. The State 
contends that even if Booth went to trial in hopes of obtaining a conviction for second-degree 
murder rather than first-degree murder, there no is reason to conclude that his sentence would 
have been any different and, therefore, rejecting the plea agreement and proceeding to trial 
would not have been rational under the circumstances. Rather, the State asserts that Booth's best 
option was to plead guilty and request leniency from the court regarding the sentence. 
In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148 
Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). When a defendant alleges 
8 On appeal, the State does not argue that Harris' interpretation of the statutes was correct. The State offered such an 
argument before the district court in support of its Motion to Reconsider. However, the same argument has not been 
advanced on appeal. 
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some deficiency in counsel's advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 
930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
In this case, the district court did not err in determining that, but for Harris' erroneous 
advice regarding the possibility of a fixed life sentence, Booth would have elected to proceed to 
trial. It is clear from Harris' memorandum that he advised Booth to plead guilty because he 
believed that there was a strong likelihood Booth would be convicted of first-degree murder and 
would be subject to a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury also found a statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability 
of facing a fixed life sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. 
If you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated 
circumstances, or not requesting .the court consider aggravated circumstances, 
then you would face a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever 
greater period the judge[] might impose .... My recommendation is because of 
the strong risk of spending the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be 
· your best option. 
Moreover, the Rule 11 plea agreement was based entirely on Harris and Wolffs 
erroneous interpretation of the statute. Booth pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in exchange 
for the State's agreement not to seek "an aggravated circumstance as that tenn is referenced in 
Idaho Code 18-4004." The Rule 11 agreement also required the court to refrain from making a 
"finding of an aggravated circumstance as that term is used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the 
purposes of sentencing." Harris was unable to reach an agreement with the State on what the 
recommended sentence would be at sentencing and, therefore, the plea agreement provided that 
"the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the sourid discretion of the Court." Thus, the sole 
benefit that Booth received under the plea agreement was the State's agreement not to seek 
aggravating circumstances-something Booth was never subject to in the first place. 
Lastly, Booth filed an affidavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief, 
wherein he stated that, 
I pled guilty to First Degree Murder only after my attorney Richard Harris 
threatened me with a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted op going to trial. Mr. Harris 
told me that the judge had told him that he would give the jury a special verdict 
form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. Harris told me as well as my family 
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that the jury would find an aggravating factor and that the Court would then be 
bound to sentence me to a fixed life sentence. 
I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not intentionally shoot the victim. I 
never wanted to plead guilty to the charge. I only plead [sic] guilty because Mr. 
Harris told me I would get a Fixed Life Sentence and that the Judge would be 
bound to give it to me and if I plead [sic] guilty I would only get 10 years. 
When asked at the evidentiary hearing what had convinced him to plead guilty, Booth responded, 
"[t]he fact that my attorney, the person who represented me, Richard Harris, repeatedly told me 
that ifl did take this to trial, there is a huge chance that I would do life in prison .... I would die in 
prison." Based on this evidence, the district court did not err in determining that but for Harris' 
error, Booth wouJd not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
The State's arguments on appeal fail for several reasons. First, the State misstates the law 
when arguing that "even if Boot)1 would have insisted on going to trial in the hopes of obtaining 
a conviction on second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder, Booth would have faced 
the same potential penalty he believed he was subject to· when he pied guilty to first-degree 
murder, i.e., up to life with a minimum of ten years fixed." Contrary to the State's assertion, the 
potential penalty for first-degree murder differs significantly from the potential penalty for 
second-degree murder. Under LC .. § 18-4004, second-degree murder is "punishable by 
imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life." I.C. § 18-
4004. In contrast, following a conviction for first-degree murder, in cases where the death 
penalty is not sought, the court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with a 
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten years. LC. § 18-4004. In other words, a 
defendant convicted of first-degree murder automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence 
with a fixed term of ten years, while a defendant convicted of second-degree murder only faces a 
fixed term of ten years, with an undefined indeterminate term. Therefore, the State erroneously 
argues that Booth would have faced the same potential penalty if he were convicted of second-
degree murder after trial. 
More importantly, the State's arguments demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the law as itrelates'to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The State's.arguments focus on 
the fact that Booth has not demonstrated that the outcome of his case, specifically, his sentence, 
would have been any different if he went to trial. However, in this context, the relevant inquiry is 
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whether, but for Harris' errors, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. As this Court has previously noted, the 
focus is "on the defendant's state of mind when choosing to plead guilty," and there is no 
requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense 
should the jury convict on that basis at retrial. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 853, 103 P.3d at 466. Thus, 
the State's arguments fail because they do not address Booth's state of mind when pleading 
guilty or how his state of mind was affected by Harris' erroneous advice. 9 As mentioned above, 
the evidence demonstrates that Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial if were not for Harris' advice regarding the potential of a fixed life sentence. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
The d,istrict court did not err in concluding that Booth met his burden of demonstrating 
Harris' performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Therefore, we affirm the 
district court's decision to grant Booth's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
9 The State also appears to argue that Booth was not prejudiced because his best option was to plead guilty .and 
request leniency from the court based on the victim's mutual involvement in the drug community, his own drug 
addiction at the time of the murder, and his assertion that he acted out of fear for the safety of himself and his 
family. Although the State may be correct that Booth likely benefited by taking responsibility and pleading guilty to 
the crime, such a factor is not relevant in determining whether Booth has met his burden of demonstrating prejudice. 
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea-an opportunity to 
withdraw the plea and proceed to trial-imposes its own significant limiting principle. Those who 
collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. 
Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas 
proceeding because ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the 
defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar 
potential downside. 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485-86 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefited by pleading 
guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' deficient performance. 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 · 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
for record, D. Ray Barker, and sets forth the facts and the arguments in support of 
Defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Judge Stegner presided over the trial of the Defendant in the year 2000 
and the sentencing in 2001. Judge Stegner also presided over the criminal proceedings 
of the Defendant's Co-Defendants, Mary Abitz, CR-00-00262; Sonja Abitz, CROO-
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
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00263; Bernadette Lasater, CR 00-00264; and Martha Millar, CR 00-02022. Judge 
Stegner ordered presentence investigations, hereinafter PSl's on each of the above-
named Co-Defendants and sentenced each of the above-named Co-Defendants. 
2. From 2001 through 2006, Judge Stegner presided over Defendant's Post-
Conviction Relief, hereinafter PCR proceedings in Latah County Case No. CV 01-
004272. 
3. At the sentencing hearing of Sonja Abitz on September 5, 2001, Judge 
Stegner made the following statement: 
COURT: Well, let's get to the point. This statement, 
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is some 
of the most incriminating testimony against Dale 
Shackelford. As I was saying, this statement is some of the 
most incriminating testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior 
to trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminating 
testimony against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at 
trial. And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz 
from this statement. (TR. P.42, Ln 3-11) 
4. In the above-quoted statement, Judge StegnE?r was referring to a 
statement made by Sonja Abitz on February 12, 2000, without the benefit of counsel, 
while in custody at the Latah County Jail, during an interrogation by a law enforcement 
officer. 
5. In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner stated that he saw the 
statement during or shortly before the trial and stated that it didn't come out at trial. 
6. The trial Judge Stegner was referring to was the trial of the Defendant 
which occurred between October 16, 2000 and December 22, 2000. 
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
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7. In the previous proceedings in this matter and in the proceedings of the 
above-named Co-Defendants, Judge Stegner has expressed his opinions that the 
Defendant manipulated, deceived, coerced and utilized other improper, illegal and 
immoral schemes to influence others including Co-Defendants to perform acts they 
would not otherwise perform. 
ARGUMENT 
A motion to disqualify a judge for cause may be made at any time, Idaho Criminal 
Rule 25(c), and may be used to disqualify a judge who is biased or prejudiced for or 
against any party or that party's case in an action; Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4). It is 
well settled in Idaho that due process requires an impartial judge. State v. Sandoval-
Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003). Judges in Idaho also have the option of 
voluntarily disqualifying himself or herself. Idaho Criminal Rule 25(d). 
In this case, Judge Stegner apparently reviewed the statement of Sonja Abitz · 
before or during the trial of the Defendant. The hearing in which the judge made the 
above-quoted statement was on September 5, 2001. The sentencing hearing in this 
case commenced on August 27, 2001, and the Judge announced the sentence on 
October 25, 2001. The above-quoted statement is inadmissible testimonial hearsay and 
cannot be used against the Defendant. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. 
Ct. 1354, 158 LEd. 2d 177 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court ovE:muled Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 2.Ed. 2d 597 (1980) and held that out-of-court 
statements that qualify as testimonial are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause 
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause - 3 
._fl~-,, 0·6'6 
·, 
unless the witness is unavailable and Defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. Such statements include at a minimum, prior testimony at a 
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and statements elicited 
during police interrogations. Prior to Crawford, under the Roberts test, the right to 
confrontation did not bar admission of an unavailable witness statement against a 
criminal defendant if the statement bore "adequate indicia of reliability", a test met when 
the evidence either falls within a firmly routed hearsay exception or bore "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness. Roberts at 488 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. The court 
discredited the reliability standard and stated that the Roberts b;;st allows a jury to hear 
evidence untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of 
reliability Crawford at 1"370, 124 S. Ct. 
In this case, Judge Stegner has reviewed voluminous materials that are 
testimonial hearsay which have not been subjected to cross examination. One example 
is the above-quoted statement of Sonja Abitz. He has read numerous statements taken 
by law enforcement officers which are clearly testimonial hearsay. 
What is testimonial hearsay and, subject to the right of confrontation, and what is 
not was addressed in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 547 U.S. 813, 165 L.Ed.2d 
224 (2006) which provides that statements taken by police officers in the course of an · 
interrogation a~e "nontestimonial" and not subject to the Confrontation Clause, when 
they are made under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency and 
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
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statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogation are "testimonial" and 
subject to the Confrontation Clause when the circumstances objectively indicate that 
there is not ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to the later criminal prosecution. The case held that 
responses to a 911 operator during an incident in which the victim identified her 
assailant while he was inside her home were not testimonial,.but that written statements 
in an affidavit given to police officers who responded to the domestic disturbance were 
testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause. 
Virtually, all of the reports generated by law enforcement in this case are 
testimonial and therefore inadmissible testimonial hearsay. It would appear that Judge 
Stegner has read most, if not all, such reports generated in the case of the Defendant 
and the cases of all of his co-defendants. 
In the Post Conviction Relief proceedings, the State requested that all of the 
notes of the defense counsel be turned over to the State for purposes of the State's 
response to the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The extraordinary result of that 
request was that the defense counsel was directed to turn over their notes from their 
files made during the preparation of the case and during the trial to the trial judge to 
review so that the judge could determine what would and would not be turned over to 
the State. Therefore, Judge Stegner has in this case, reviewed all of the notes of 
defense counsel. The State was given the notes due to the waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege based on the claims made in the petition for Post Conviction Relief. But that 
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
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attorney-client privilege should not be considered a basis for the court to review such 
notes and still remain in the case for subsequent purposes. 
Judge Stegner has also been exposed to all of the victim impact statements 
contained in the original Presentence Investigation Report and to those given orally at 
. the sentencing hearings. Many of those statements contained inflammatory statements 
about the Defendant, his character, and the crime. Numerous witnesses testified at the 
sentencing hearing and gave their opinions about the Defendant, his character, and the 
crime. Several of the witnesses expressed their wishes that all manner of punishments 
be imposed on the Defendant. None of such statements or testimony should have been 
admitted and Judge Stegner should not have been exposed to either the statements nor 
the testimony. In addition, persons who were not immediate family members gave 
victim impact statements. In State v. Payne, Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008), the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered victim impact statements which described Payne as evil, a 
waste aspirin, a sociopath, a cold blooded killer, unremorseful, a predator, cold and 
calculating, not a man, a pathetic monster, a wimp and a man without a conscience. 
Witnesses also expressed their wishes that Payne "rot in hell, burn in hell or be 
tortured." The court held that these statements were characterizations and opinions 
about Payne, the crime, his appropriate punishment, and calls to religious authority as 
the basis for punishment and were all inadmissible. The statements and testimony 
described in Payne, is not unlike that which was presented in the Defendant's initial 
sentencing hearing and Judge Stegner was exposed to all of it. 
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In Payne, the court also held that l.C.§19-5306, limits victim impact' statements to 
immediate family members. Judge Stegner also heard victim impact statements from 
non-immediate family members. 
In Payne, the court considered at length, the issue of whether the admission of 
the inadmissible victim impact statements could be considered harmless error. The 
court acknowledged that judges are able to sort out truly relevant, admissible evidence 
presented in the form of victim ·impact statements. The court stated that considering the 
nature and the high volume of victim impact statements and statements by the District 
Court, there was reasonable doubt as to whether the inadmissible evidence contributed 
to Payne's sentence and based on that reasonable doubt, the court vacated Payne's 
sentence and remanded for resentencing. 
It is quite possible that a reviewing court in this case would conclude that the 
inadmissible evidence and information in the form in testimonial hearsay and victim 
impact statements combined with the knowledge Judge Stegner has obtained from 
reviewing the notes of defense counsel and dealing with all of the related cases taken 
together lead to the conclusion that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether all these 
things contributed to the sentence imposed in this resentencing. 
The bell has been rung many times in this case, more time than it can be unrung 
even with the best of intentions and integrity. 
Brief in Support of Defendant's 
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DATED this _g,.,, /day of August, 2011. £2 ,.// ;/~l 1! 
~~ ,:lk7~:5a.,1./_,__ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :> y/f day of August, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of 
the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[] First-class mail 
~;(] Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
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D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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v. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant. 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
FOR CAUSE 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says 
as follows: 
1. Judge Stegner presided over the trial of the Defendant in the year 2000 
and the sentencing in 2001. Judge Stegner also presided over the criminal proceedings 
of the Defendant's Co-Defendants, Mary Abitz, CR-00-00262; Sonja Abitz, CR00-
00263; Bernadette Lasater, CR 00-00264; and Martha Millar, CR 00-02022. Judge 
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 
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Stegner ordered presentence investigations, hereinafter PS l's on each of the above-
named Co-Defendants and sentenced each of the above-named Co-Defendants. 
2. From 2001 through 2006, Judge Stegner presided over Defendant's Post-
Conviction Relief, hereinafter PCR proceedings in Latah County Case No. CV 01-
004272. 
3. At the sentencing hearing of Sonja Abitz on September 5, 2001, Judge 
Stegner made the following statement: 
COURT: Well, let's get to the point. This statement, 
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is some 
of the most incriminating testimony against Dale 
Shackelford. As I was saying, this statement is some of the 
most incriminating testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior 
to trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminating 
testimony against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at 
trial. And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz 
from this statement. (TR. P.42, Ln 3-11) 
4. In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner was referring to a 
statement made by Sonja Abitz on February 12, 2000, without the benefit of counsel, 
while in custody at the Latah County Jail, during an interrogation by a law enforcement 
officer. 
5. In the above-quoted statement, Judge Stegner stated that he saw the 
statement during or shortly before the trial and stated that it didn't come out at trial. 
6. The trial Judge Stegner was referring to was the trial of the Defendant 
which occurred between October 16, 2000 and December 22, 2000. 
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 
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7. In the previous proceedings in this matter and in the proceedings of the 
above-named Co-Defendants, Judge Stegner has expressed his opinions that the 
Defendant manipulated, deceived, coerced and utilized other improper, illegal and 
immoral schemes to influence others including Co-Defendants to perform acts they 
would not otherwise perform. 
DATED thisd~~day 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Q.C/\ day ofe\J (f/I I, 
2011. I 
' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ay of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed 
to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person ilJ charge of the office of or 
serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[] · First-class mail 
N Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
for record, D. Ray Barker, and pursuant to Rule 25(b)(4) moves to disqualify the 
Honorable Judge John R. Stegner for cause. Such a disqualification would have the 
effect of preventing Judge Stegner from presiding in the scheduled resentencing of the 
Defendant's Motion for Disqualification 
for Cause -1 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of August, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of 
the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 






o. Ray B?'ker 
Attorney at Law 
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(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
OF SENTENCING HEARING 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
for record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for a continuance of the sentencing 
hearing scheduled for August 26, 2011, at 9:00 a.m. in Orofino, Idaho. 
The basis for the motion is that the Defendant's counsel has insufficient time to 
prepare for the hearing and to meet with and review materials with the Defendant. 
Defense counsel has been reviewing materials including a transcript of the original 
sentencing hearing. Defense counsel intends to review the original PSI as well as the 
updated PSI which was received on August 8, 2011. Said counsel was advised that the 
Motion for Continuance - 1 
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Defendant would be moved during the first week of August. On Friday, August 5, 2011, 
counsel contacted the Idaho State Prison and was advised that instead of being 
transported the first week of August, that the Defendant would be transported in the 
next ten to twelve days. Counsel had intended to meet with the Defendant at Orofino 
during the first week of August if he had been transferred that week and also intended 
to meet with him during this second week of August. Now, it appears that the 
Defendant will not be in Orofino until some time in the third week of August. Counsel 
cannot prepare for a sentencing hearing on August 26, 2011, and adequately represent 
his client. 
There is also pending before the court a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause. It 
was the intent of counsel to set that motion for hearing after the Defendant was 
transported to Orofino so that the Defendant could be present for that hearing. 
A continuance of approximately three weeks is requested. 
DATED this 9/4 day of August, 2011. 
Motion for Continuance - 2 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of August, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of 
the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[] First-class mail 
[x] Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
D. Ray Bqrker 
Attorney at Law 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
STIPULATION RE: RESPONSE TO 
PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT 
IT IS HEREBY stipulated between the State and the Defendant, Dale C. 
Shackelford, that the defense be allowed additional time in which to file its objection and 
responses to the Presentence Investigation Report as updated, and to produce a 
witness list. It is stipulated that such objection and responses shall be filed on or before 
August 23, 2011. 
Stipulation Re: Response to - 1 
Presentence Investigation Report 
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DATED this 11th day of August, 2011. 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorne/for Defendant 
Stipulation Re: Response to - 2 
Presentence Investigation Report 
William W. Thomps 





D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
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(208) 882-6749 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 












Case No. CR-00-00260 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
FOR CAUSE 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the Defendant's 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause at the courtroom of the above-entitled court at the Latah 
County Courthouse, 522 S. Adams, Moscow, Idaho, on the 23rd day of August, 2011, at the hour 
of 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 11th day of August, 2011. 
D.RayB ker 
Attorne, for Defendant 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 lth day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by 
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by 
facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
N Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 883-2290 
By: 
D.Rayar7r 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
FORCAUSE-2 
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D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-6749 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF 
SENTENCING HEARING 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the Defendant's 
Motion for Continuance of Sentencing Hearing at the courtroom of the above-entitled court at 
the Latah County Courthouse, 522 S. Adams, Moscow, Idaho, on the 23rd day of August, 2011, 
at the hour of9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DA TED this 11th day of August, 2011. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE OF SENTENCING HEARING - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of August, 2011, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to, or by 
personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of the office of or serving by 
facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 







Facsimile (208) 883-2290 
D~tt~ 
D.RaYarker 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE OF SENTENCING HEARING - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 













Case No. CR-2000-260 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 
It is ORDERED that the above named defendant be transported· from the 
Idaho Correctional Institution in Orofino, Idaho, to the Clearwater · County 
Courthouse for hearing of his Motion to Disqualify at 10:00 A.l\tf. on August 26, 2011. 
rJ.. 
. DATED this tJ day of August 2011. 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - l 
91/V'-~~-
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
087 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE' 
I do hereby certify that a full, true 
complete and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was transmitted 
by facsimile to: 
D. RAY BARKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
882-7604 
CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
208-476-7835 
and hand delivered to: 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY · 
and sent by PFD email to: 




IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION 
bp hillip@idoc.id. gov 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT - 2 088 
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Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
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Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 












Case No. CR-00-00260 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AND 
RESPONSES TO PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION AND WITNESS 
LIST 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
for record, D. Ray Barker, and objects to and responds to the Presentence Report dated 
March 6, 2001, and the Update to the Presentence Investigation dated August 4, 2011. 
OBJECTIONS 
I. The Defendant objects to the consideration of the three DOR's described 
on page one of the Update to Presentence Investigation on the basis that he did nothing 
wrong in each incident as he will explain at the sentencing hearing. The Defendant also 
objects to the C-Notes as cumulative in that the DOR'S are mentioned repeatedly and 
include material taken out of context. 
Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence 
Investigation and Witness List - 1 
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II. The Defendant objects to the letter from R. Scott Killen, the Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorney from Madison Gounty, Missouri on the basis of the holding in 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004). That 
holding was that out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are barred, 
under the Confrontation Clause, unless the witnesses are unavailable and Defendants 
had prior opportunity to cross-'examine witnesses. 
Ill. The Defendant objects to the letter from Suzanne Birrell, NEE, Ninichuck 
on the basis of the holding in State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199, P.3d 123 (2008) 
which limited victim impact statements to members of the deceased's immediate family. 
Suzanne Birrell, NEE, Ninichuck is not a member of the immediate family. 
IV. The Defendant objects to the letters from Bernadette Lasater, addressed 
to Judge John Stegner, on the basis of the holding in Crawford v. Washington, as stated 
above. Although Bernadette Lasater was subject to cross-examination by the defense 
at trial, she was not subject to cross examination as to the statements contained in 
those letters, authored a decade or more after the trial. 
V. The Defendant objects to the letter from Martha J. Millar on the basis of 
the holding in Crawford v. Washington, as stated above. Although Martha J. Millar was 
subject to cross-examination by the defense at trial, she was not subject to cross-
examination as to the statements contained in those letters. 
VI. The Defendant objects to the form entitled "Idaho Maximum Security 
Institution Acknowledgment of Monitoring of Phone Calls" on which is hand-written 
"Inmate refused to Sign." The basis of the objection is relevance. Mr. Shackelford 
simply did not choose to consent to the monitoring of his telephone calls. This is an 
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attempt to put a negative spin on an inmate simply expressing his displeasure with a 
policy. He had no obligation to sign the document. 
VII. The Defendant objects to the "Official Version" at page 2 of the original 
Presentence Report to the extent that it is a recitation of the conclusions of the 
prosecutor. This objection is based on the holding in United States v. Rome, 207 F.3d 
251 (5th Cir, 2000) which states at, 254, as follows: 
[4] A PSR generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be 
considered as evidence by a sentencing judge when making 
factual determinations. United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 
F.3d 530, 537 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046, 119 S. 
Ct. 601, 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998). An exception is made, 
however, when the PSR simply gives "a recitation of the 
conclusions of ... the prosecutor." United States v. Elwood, 
999 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1993). 
This objection is made specifically to the first full paragraph of page three of the 
original Presentence Report which begins with the words, "Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Robin Eckman, reported ... " 
VIII. The Defendant objects to the victim impact statements contained in the 
original Presentence Report, at pages five and six, specifically, the statements of Mike 
Palahniuk in which he states that Mr. Shackelford's life should be taken; Chuck 
Palahniuk in which he states that he would like the State to execute Mr. Shackelford 
and that he requests to witness the execution while also quoting religious authority 
regarding punishment. This objection is based on Idaho Criminal Rule 32(c) which 
prohibits specific recommendations regarding sentencing and on State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 193 P.3d 123 (2008) which prohibits victim impact statements which are 
characterization and opinions about the Defendant, the crime, the appropriate 
punishment and calls to religious authority as a basis for punishment. 
Defendant's Objections and Responses to Presentence 
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IX. The Defendant objects to the inclusion under the Prior Records Section at 
page 7 of the original Presentence Report of the reference to a Forcible Rape With 
Weapon or Injury; Forcible Sodomy; Felonious Restraint dated 08/26/1998. The basis 
of the objection is that those charges were dismissed and should not be included. 
X. The Defendant objects to the statement on page eight of the original 
Presentence Report, third paragraph that he had reported to a prison official that he had 
also been charged with felonious use of a weapon and rape in connection with the 
sodomy case. He was not charged with felonious use of a weapon and never told a 
prison official that he was so charged. He was charged with Rape, but was found not 
guilty of that offense. Offenses for which a defendant is found to be not guilty ought not 
to appear in a Presentence Report. The prejudicial effect outweighs any probative 
value. This objection is based on the same reasoning as Rule 403 Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. 
XI. The Defendant objects to the fifth paragraph on page eight of the original 
Presentence Report which makes reference to his having been charged with 
possession of dangerous contraband and attempting to escape and having been 
acquitted of those charges. Again, the prejudicial effect of such information outweighs 
any probative value as stated in said Rule 403. 
XII. The Defendant further objects to the entry contained in the Offender History 
attached to the Update to the Presentence Investigation appearing on the page 
designated on the bottom as 00025 and dated May 15, 2006, which includes a verbal 
threat to kill one of the guards and states that the Defendant would get a DOR. That 
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event did not happen and Mr. Shackelford did not receive a DOR for threatening staff as 
stated in that entry. 
RESPONSES 
I. The original Presentence Report contains several errors or misleading 
statements. On page 13, there is a statement that Mr. Shackelford tested positive for 
Tuberculosis, and he participated in preventative medication therapy. That statement 
implies that the Defendant had or has Tuberculosis. Actually, Mr. Shackelford was 
exposed to Tuberculosis and immediately thereafter participated in preventative 
medication therapy so that he would not get the disease. As a result of that medication 
therapy, he tested positive for Tuberculosis. 
II. Also on page 13, the original Presentence Report states that the Latah 
County Jail reported that Mr. Shackelford had not had any medical complaints or visits 
with the nurse, and he is not taking any medications at this time. In fact, Mr. 
Shackelford took high blood pressure medication daily during his time at the Latah 
County Jail and continues to take such medication on a daily basis. 
Ill. Under Collateral Contacts, there appear to be several contacts from whom 
there is nothing in the report as to what may have been received from that contact. 
Was there mitigating or positive information from those persons which was not 
included? One of those contacts, John Smith from Missouri Probation and parole could 
have reported that in 2000, Mr. Shackelford successfully completed his term of parole 
and was released from parole. 
The report does not include any information regarding an event in which Mr. 
Shackelford came upon a motor vehicle accident and saved several people's lives. 
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WITNESS LIST 
The Defendant intends to call as witnesses the following: 
Jackye Squire Leonard - Presentence Investigator 
Officer Jared Miller from l.M.S.I. 
Dale C. Shackelford 
DATED this .~'3,.)day of August, 2011. 
~µ 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the j? '3 yo{ day of August, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of 
the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND 
OF INAND THE 
COURT MINUTES -
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: August 26, 2011 










Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording: CD484-1 
Time: 10:42 A.M. 
Case No. CR2000-260 
APPEARANCES: 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendant present with counsel, 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, Idaho 
================================================================= 
Subject of Proceedings: MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for conducting a motion 
hearing in this matter. Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant, Dale 
Carter Shackelford. 
Court vacates the sentencing and will conduct a hearing on the Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause, at this time. 
Mr. Barker asks that the defendant's handcuffs be removed to allow him to make 
notes. Court allows the removal of the defendant's handcuffs. 
Mr. Barker makes argument regarding the Motion to Disqualify. 
Mr. Thompson advises the Court that the State will rely on the briefing that has 
been previously given to the Court. Mr. Thompson further advises that this case has 
been sent back for re-sentencing on two of the counts. Mr. Thompson asks the Court to 
deny the Motion to Disqualify and set a date for re-sentencing. 
Mr. Barker advises the Court that the Motion For Disqualification for Cause is an 
Deputy Clerk - Christy L. Gering 
COURT MINUTES - 1 of 2 
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STATE OF IDAHO V. DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD 
ex parte proceeding and does not think the State has standing to make this objection. 
Mr. Thompson responds. 
Court denies the Motion to Disqualify for Cause. 
Court schedules sentencing for September 28, 2011, at 10:00 A.M. Court asks 
Mr. Thompson how many witnesses he will have. Mr. Thompson advises the Court that 
he does not anticipate having any witnesses, however the defense has identified 3 
witnesses. Mr. Barker advises the Court that one of the witnesses will be the defendant. 
Mr. Barker further advises the Court that the hearing will take an hour or two hours, at the 
most. 
Court requests Mr. Thompson to prepare an Order Denying the Motion to 
Disqualify. 
Court in recess at 10:54 A.M. 
Deputy Clerk - Christy L. Gering 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
FOR CAUSE 
On the 26th day of August, 2011, the defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
his counsel, D. Ray Barker, and the State's attorney, William W. Thompson, Jr., appeared 
before the Court, at the Clearwater County Courthouse in Orofino, Idaho, for hearing of 
the defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause. The Court heard arguments of 
Counsel, reviewed the case file herein, directed statements to the Defendant and c·ounsel, 
and HEREBY ORDERS Defendant's Motion for Disqualification for Cause BE DENIED for 
reasons articulated by the Court on the record. 
DATED this. 2.h~y of AV\~~ l-'- , 2011, nuncpro tunctoAugust26, 2011. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE: Page -1-
J oli.n R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE were served on the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[]U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
,H1<ax S8Z 7e,,,or 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
William W. Thompson, Jr. [] U.S. Mail 
Prosecuting Attorney []Overnight Mail 
Latah County Courthouse [] Fax · 
Moscow, ID 83843 'ZY _,/ ..J.-!1{and Delivery 
Dated this Jtb day of ~ , 2011. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE: Page -2-
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D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











Case No. CR-00-00260 
MOTION FOR A SPECIFIC 
SENTENCE 
--- DEPUTY 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Dale C. Shackelford, by and through his attorney 
of record, D. Ray Barker, and moves the Court for the imposition of a specific sentence. 
The specific sentence hereby requested is an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed 
term of ten years. The motion is based on the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion, filed June 
11, 2011, Docket Number 37296, a copy of which is attached hereto. (A copy is also 
attached to the State's Reply to "Defendant's Response to Notice of State's Decision to 
Not Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing previously filed herein). 
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In the Booth Opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court, at page 13, beginning on the 
tenth line from the bottom of the page, states as follows: 
In other words a defendant convicted of first-degree murder 
automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a 
fixed term of ten years ... 
The Defendant is hereby requesting the sentence that the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated is automatic in these circumstances. The Defendant stands convicted of first 
degree murder and the state is not seeking a death penalty which is the same 
circumstances as existed in Booth. 
Mr. Shackelford is simply requesting the sentence which the Idaho Supreme 
Court has stated should be automatically imposed. 
DATED this j <Jfd day of 
o. RaYBrker 
Attorney for Respondent 
Motion For A Specific Sentence - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (:3ftt day of September, 2011, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in charge of 
the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William C. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 




Motion For A Specific Sentence - 3 101 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STA TE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 37296 
JAMES 
Petitioner-Respondent, Boise, June 2011 Term 
Y. 2011 Opinion No. 78 











Filed: June 29, 2011 
Respond en t-Ap pell ant. Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third. Judicial District of the State ofidaho, 
Canyon County. The Honorable Gregory Culet, District Judge. 
The district court's order, granting post-conviction relief, is affirmed. 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth 
K. Jorgensen argued. 
Law Offices of Van G. Bishop, Nampa, for respondent. Van G. Bishop argued. 
J. JONES, Justice.· 
The State ofidaho appeals the district court's order granting Trevor Booth's petition for 
post-conviction relief on the ground that Booth received ineffective assistance of counsel. We 
affirm. 
I. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds that he 
sustained at his residence. After an investigation, law enforcement suspected that Trevor Booth 
was responsible for the shooting. Law enforcement based this conclusion on several pieces of 
evidence obtained during the investigation. First, law enforcement dete1mined that the perpetrator 
had entered Kellum's residence through the back door and shot him five times using an improvised 
silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle. Law enforcement found a single set of footprints leading 
102 
from the back door of Kellum' s residence to the street, where neighbors said a black pickup truck 
was parked at the time of the shooting. Booth, who owned a black pickup truck, told law 
enforcement that he had driven to Kellum's residence on the moming Kellum was shot to pick up 
marijuana that he planned to sell. Booth claimed he parked his pickup truck on the street and 
approached the front door of the residence where he heard screaming and gunshots. Booth told law 
enforcement that he left the residence after hearing the shots. However, before Kellum passed 
away, he was transpmied to the hospital where he identified Booth as the person who had shot him. 
Booth was subsequently charged with first-degree murder, and was represented by Richard 
Harris. Although the crime of first-degree murder carries a potential penalty of death, 1 the State 
declined to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, thereby establishing that Booth's case 
was a non-capital case. 2 During the time the case was pending, Harris met with Booth periodically 
to discuss Booth's version of the events leading up to Kellum 's death. Although Booth initially 
maintained that he did not commit the offense, he eventually acknowledged that he killed Kellum, 
but asserted he did so in order to defend himself and his family. Booth told Harris that he was 
actively involved in selling controlled substances and Kellum was his supplier. Booth explained 
that he eventually fell behind in paying Kellum for the drugs he had supplied, and Kellum began 
making threats of physical violence towards Booth, his family, and his girlfriend if he did not pay 
the money owed. 
Prior to trial, Gearld Wolff, the prosecutor handling Booth's case, informed Harris that he 
intended to file a motion requesting that the Court provide a special verdict fom1 to be used by the 
jury if Booth was convicted of first-degree murder. Specifically, the proposed verdict form would 
instruct the jury to determine whether certain statutory aggravating circumstances delineated in LC. 
§ 19-2515(9)3 existed, including whether (1) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 
manifesting exceptional depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances surrounding its 
1 According to l.C. § 19-2515(1), 
Except as provided in section 19-251 SA, Idaho Code, a person convicted of murder in the first 
degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a 
killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person 
"directly committed the acts that caused death. 
All statutory citations in this opinion will refer to those in effect at the time that Booth's criminal case was pending. 
2 Pursuant to J.C. § 19-25 l 5(3)(a), a defendant convicted of a crime that is punishable by death cannot be sentenced 
to death ul1less the State fi!qs a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 
31.C. § 19-2515(9) sets forth the list of statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt, before a sentence of death can bt? imposed. 
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commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life; or (3) the defendant, by prior 
conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit 
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. Wolff communicated to 
Harris his understanding that pursuant to I.C. § 18-4004, the statute dealing with the penalties for 
first-degree murder, the State could seek an instruction regarding statutory aggravating 
circumstances even in a non-capital case. LC. § 18-4004 4 provides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided fmther that. whenever the death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the comt if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjust, the cmirt shall impose a fixed life sentence. 
If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, does not find a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the 
court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not 
less than ten (10) years during which period of confinement the offender shall not 
be eligible for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of sentence for good 
conduct, except for meritorious service. Every person guilty of murder of the 
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life. 
Wolff interpreted this statute to mean that if the jury were to find any statutory aggravating 
circumstances in a non-capital case, the comt would then be required to impose a fixed life 
sentence. 
After examining the statute, Harris agreed With Wolff's interpretation and believed Booth 
would be subject to a fixed life sentence if the jury were to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
statutory aggravating circumstance existed~ Harris and Wolff subsequently met with the district 
court judge prior to the scheduled pretrial conference to discuss the State's intent to request the 
special verdict form. During this meeting, the parties discussed Wolff and Harris's mutual 
understanding of LC. § 18-4004. The judge informed Wolff and Harris that the court would likely 
4 LC. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 were amended in 2003 to reflect the requirement established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that a jury, rather than a judge, find the necessary statutory 




use the special verdict form if it was requested by the State and supported by the evidence. 
Thereafter, Harris prepared a memorandum to Booth outlining his understanding of the 
potential penalties if Booth were to be convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. In the 
memorandum, Harris set forth the text of LC. § 18-4004 and explained that, 
What this statute means is that upon a conviction for first degree murder, if the jury 
or judge if [a] jury is waived, finds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt[,] the sentence is death. However, if the prosecutor does not seek 
death, as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, then 
the sentence is a fixed life sentence. That means the person sentenced will spend his 
life in prison and will die there. At the pre-trial conference on Friday the Judge 
indicated to the prosecutor and myself that he will submit a verdict form to the jury 
that will ask the question of the jury: "Did Trevor Booth commit the crime of first 
degree murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also contain the same question 
for second degree murder and for manslaughter. If the jury finds you guilty of first 
degree murder, the verdict form will contain the further question for the jury: "do 
you find beyond a reasonable doubt a statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or 
No." Since the trial judge intends to submit the question to the jury as part of the 
verdict form and if the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance as part of the 
verdict,. then the sentence to be imposed by the judge, notwithstanding all the 
evidence there is in mitigation, [is] a fixed life sentence which means you will 
spend the rest of your life in prison. · 
The memorandum goes on to explain what statutory aggravating circumstances the State intended 
to prove. Harris mentioned that in his experience, "it is not too difficult for a finding to be made 
that a murder is heinous (a murder by definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel or 
alternatively that by committing the murder, the defendant showed utter disregard for life." Harris 
also described, in. detail, all of the State's evidence against Booth, and explained "based upon the 
evidence as currently presented, I believe the high probability is that the jury is going to return a 
verdict of guilty." Finally, Harris advised Booth that his best option was to consider entering into a 
plea agreement with the State. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability of 
facing a fixed 1 ife sentence. That means spending the rest of your life in prison. If 
you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated circumstances, 
or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances, then you would face 
a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever greater period the 
judge[] might impose. I have indicated above I do not think the Judge would 
impose a term greater tha[n] fifteen years followed by an indeterminate life. Life in 
that context means thirty years. My recommendation is because of the strong risk of 
spending the rest of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be your best option. 
After giving the memorandum to Booth, Harris met with Booth's family members to 
4 
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explain and discuss the memorandum. Harris discussed with Booth's family the nuances of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances and the risks associated with taking the case to trial. During 
this time, Harris continued to negotiate with Wolff regarding a potential plea agreement. 
Booth subsequently entered into a Rule 11 plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the 
plea agreement, Booth agreed fo plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for the State's 
agreement not to pursue statutory aggravating circumstances as part of sentencing. The Rule l l 
agreement was filed with the court on June 9, 2005, and Booth entered a plea of guilty on the same 
day. After holding a sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Booth to an indeterminate life 
sentence with thirty years fixed. 
After a failed appeal challenging his sentence, 5 Booth timely filed a petition for post-
conviction relief. The court dismissed all of Booth's allegations in suppoti of his petition upon the 
State's motion for summary dismissal, except for his allegations that (1) Harris used coerCive and 
threatening tactics to get him to plead guilty by assuring him and his family that he would receive a 
ten year fixed sentence if he pleaded guilty and a fixed life sentence if he took the case to trial; and 
(2) Harris used the sentencing memorandum to coerce him into pleading guilty and was not 
adequately prepared to go to trial even though Booth felt he "had nothing to loose [sic] by going to 
trial." 
After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that Harris' 
representation of Booth fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because Harris 
erroneously advised Booth that he would be subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he went to 
trial and the State's special verdict fonn was presented to the jury. According to the district court, 
I.C. § 18-4004 clearly indicates that if Booth's case had gone to trial, and the jury had found an 
aggravating circumstance, such a finding would "merely have been advisory in nature and the 
court would not have been mandated to sentence Booth to a fixed life tenn, but would actually 
have been bound only to sentence within the parameters of a life sentence, with any fixed portion 
above ten years .... "The court also detennined that there was a reasonable probability that but for 
HaiTis' erroneous interpretation of the statute, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have proceeded to trial. Therefore, the district court granted Booth's petition for post-conviction 
relief and ordered his guilty plea to be withdrawn and the case set for jury trial. The State timely 
5 Booth appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, where his sentence was affirmed. 
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appealed to this Court. 
Issue on Appeal 
I. Whether the district court erred in granting Booth's petition for post-conviction relief 
on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
III. 
Discussion 
A. Standa1·d of Review 
When reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for post-conviction 
relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will not disturb the district court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); State v. Murray, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921, 828 P.2d at 1326; Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). When faced with a mixed question of fact and law, the Court will defer 
to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but will exercise free 
review over the application of the relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 921-22, 828 
P.2d at 1326-27. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
State Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010). A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure 
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance 
was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 
Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460, 463 (2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This Court applies the 
Strickland test when determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the plea process. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463. Before deciding 
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010). In this case, we conclude that the district 
court did not err in determining that Harris' representation of Booth during the plea process was 
deficient and that Booth was prejudiced as a result of such deficiency. 
6 . 
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l. Deficient Performance 
On appeal, the State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating Harris' 
performance was deficient because, even though the court ultimately concluded that Harris' 
interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was incorrect, his interpretation was nevertheless objectively 
reasonable under the circumstances. According to the State, the reasonableness of Harris' 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the prosecutor also believed that the statute would 
require the court to impose a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury found a statutory 
aggravating circumstance. The State further argues that the district court also appeared to agree 
with HmTis' interpretation, given that it intended to provide the jury with a special verdict form 
instructing them to consider whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proven. 
Lastly, the State contends that Harris' memorandum demonstrates that Harris had carefully 
reviewed the facts of the case, the evidence that would likely be admitted at trial, and the 
applicable law, before advising Booth that his best option was to enter a plea of guilty and, 
therefore, Harris' representation of Booth was not deficient. 
In order to demonstrate the attorney's performance was deficient, the defendant has the 
burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. In doing so, the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel 
was competent and diligent in his or her representation of the defendant. Schoger v. State, 148 
Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). Furthermore, "tactical or strategic decisions of trial 
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Howardv. State, 126 Idaho 231, 234, 880 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct .App. 1994). "Where a defendant is 
represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the 
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 
P.3d 376, 386 (2004). Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the plea represents a 
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. 
Id. 
. Although it appears that this Court has never dealt with the precise issue of whether a 
defense attorney's erroneous interpretation of a sentencing statute constitutes deficient 
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performance, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that when a statute 
unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an attorney has a duty to provide correct advice 
regarding such penalty. For example, in Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that an attorney 
engaged in deficient perfonnance by failing to advise the defendant that his plea of guilty to drug 
distribution made him. subject to automatic deportation because the consequences of the 
defendant's guilty plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute. 130 S. Ct. at 
1483. The Court reasoned that, 
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, 
clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's 
conviction .... Padilla's counsel could have easily determined that his plea would 
make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute, 
which addresses not some broad classification of crimes but specifically 
commands removal for all controlled substances convictions except for the most 
trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, Padilla's counsel provided him 
false assurance that his conviction would not result in his removal from this 
country. This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of 
Padilla's plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his 
deportation was presumptively mandatory, and his counsel's advice was incorrect. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although the Comi recognized that an attorney engages in 
deficient performance by rendering advice that is inconsistent with the ·clear provisions of a 
statute, the Court was careful to recognize that the result would not be the same where the law is 
not as clear. 
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the 
deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. The duty of 
the private practitioner in such cases is more limited. When the law is not succinct 
and straightforward ... , a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise 
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse 
immigration consequences. But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, 
as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. 
Id. Therefore, an attorney engages in deficient performance by rendering advice regarding 
potential penalties during the plea process that is inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous 
provisions of a sentencing statute. See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 422 ("The mere inaccuracy 
of a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance, but a 
gross mischaracterization of the likely outcome, combined with erroneous advice on the possible 
effects of going to trial, falls below the required level of competence.") 
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In this case, the district court did not err in finding that Harris' performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness due to his erroneous advice regarding the potential penalty 
Booth would face if convicted at trial. Harris' interpretation of f.C. § 18-4004 is contrary to the 
plain arid unambiguous language of the statute. I.C. § 18-4004 specifically provides that in first-
degree murder cases, "if the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life sentence 
with a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (I 0) years." The language of the 
statute makes it clear that in cases where the State chooses not to seek the death penalty, the 
court is required to impose an indetenninate life sentence with at least ten years fixed. 
It appears that Harris based his interpretation on the first part of LC. § 18-4004, which 
provides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 and 19-251 SA, Idaho Code, every 
person guilty of murder of the _first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life, provided that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty as required under the provisions of section l 8-4004A, Idaho Code, and 
provided further that whenever the .death penalty is not imposed the court shall 
impose a sentence. If a jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt but finds that the imposition 
of the death penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose a fixed life sentence: 
I.C. § 18-4004. However, Harris' interpretation is contrary to the plain language of this portion 
of the statute as well. First and foremost, I.C. § 18-4004 specifically references LC. §§ 19-2515 
and l 9-25 l 5A, which are both statutes that are only applicable in capital cases. LC. § 19-251 SA 
prohibits the court from imposing the death penalty against a "mentally retarded person." I.C. § 
19-2515A. Furthermore, I.C. § 19-2515 sets forth the procedures for holding a special sentencing 
proceeding in capital cases6 and articulates the instructions to be given to the jury during these 
proceedings. 7 Finally, I.C. § 19-2515(9) goes on to lay out the various statutory aggravating 
6 r.c. § 19-2515(5) provides, 
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of 
guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Icjaho Code, 
a special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant 
evidence and arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense .... The special 
sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant 
with the consent of the prosecuting attorney. 
7 According to I.C. § 19-2515(7), 
The jury shall be informed as follows: 
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circumstances that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the imposition 
of the death penalty. I.C. § 19-2515(9). The lead··in to subsection 9 states, "[t]he following are 
statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (I) of which must be found to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed." LC. § 19-2515(9) (emphasis 
added). 
These statutory sections make clear that the provision m LC. § 18-4004 requiring the 
jury, or the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life sentence for a first-degree murder 
conviction in the event that a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt applies only to those cases where the death penalty is sought. Under the 
statutory scheme, the court is only required to impose a fixed life sentence when (1) the State has 
filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty; (2) the State seeks the death penalty; (3) the 
defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, first-degree murder; (4) a special sentencing 
proceeding is held during which the jury, or the court if a jury is waived, determines that at least 
one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) after 
weighing any mitigating evidence against the statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury, or 
the court if a jury is waived, finds that imposition of the death penalty is unjust. It is clear from 
the relevant statutes that ~tatutory aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death 
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to 
trial and was convicted of first-degree murder, he would have been subject to an indeterminate 
life sentence with at least ten years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence, as Harris 
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no mitigating 
circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant 
will be sentenced to death by the court. 
(b) ·If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds that the 
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury 
cannot unanimously agree on whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and 
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury 
cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant 





Given that the information Harris provided when advising Booth to plead guilty to first-
degree murder was based on a blatantly erroneous reading of the sentencing statutes, the district 
couit did not err in determining that Harris' performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Just as in Padilla, the potential pena~ties in Idaho for first-degree murder in a 
nqn-capital case are clear from the statute and, therefore, Harris' duty to give correct advice in 
that regard is equally clear. It cannot be said that Booth's plea was entered voluntarily when 
HaiTis' advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60, 106 P.3d at 386. 
Moreover, the State's argument that Harris' interpretation of LC. § 18-4004 was 
reasonable because the district judge and the prosecutor appeared to share the same interpretation 
is without merit. Just because other parties shared Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute 
does not mean Harris' interpretation was reasonable, given that such an interpretation is contrary 
to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Therefore, we find that Booth met his 
burden of demonstrating that Harris' perfonnance was deficient. 
2. Prejudice 
The State argues that Booth has not met his burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced 
by Harris' allegedly deficient performance because, even if Booth had insisted on going to trial, 
he would have still been subject to the· same penalty as when he pleaded guilty. The State 
contends that even if Booth went to trial in hopes of obtaining a conviction for second-degree 
murder rather than first-degree murder, there no is reason to conclude that his sentence would 
have been any different and, therefore, rejecting the plea agreement and proceeding to trial 
would not have been rational under the circumstances. Rather, the State asserts that Booth's best 
option was to plead guilty and request leniency from the court regarding the sentence. 
In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that 
the outCome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148 
Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). When a defendant alleges 
8 On appeal, the State does not argue that Harris' interpretation of the statutes was correct. The State offered such an 
argument before the district court in support of its Motion to Reconsider. However, the same argument has not been 
advanced on appeal. 
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some deficiency in counsel's advice regarding a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 
930 (2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
In this case, the district court did not err in determining that, but for Harris' erroneous 
advice regarding the possibility of a fixed life sentence, Booth would have elected to proceed to 
trial. It is clear from Harris' memorandum that he advised Booth to plead guilty because he 
believed that there was a strong likelihood Booth would be convicted of first-degree murder and 
would be subject to a fixed life sentence in the event that the jury also found a statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, there is the very strong probability 
of facing a fixed life sentence. That i11eans spending the rest of your life in prison. 
If you enter a plea to murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated 
circumstances, or not requesting the court consider aggravated circumstances, 
then you would face a minimum period of incarceration of ten years or whatever 
greater period the judge[] might impose .... My recommendation is because of 
the strong risk of spending the rest ofyour life in prison, a plea agreement may be 
your best option. 
Moreover, the Rule 11 plea agreement was based entirely on Harris and Wolffs 
erroneous interpretation of the statute. Booth pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in exchange 
for the State's agreement not to seek "an aggravated circumstance as that term is referenced in 
Idaho Code 18-4004." The Rule 11 agreement also required the court to refrain from making a 
"finding of an aggravated circumstance as that term is used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the 
purposes of sentencing." Harris was unable to reach an agreement with the State on what the 
recommended sentence would be at sentencing and, therefore, the plea agreement provided that 
"the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the sound discretion of the Court." Thus, the sole 
benefit that Booth received under the plea agreement was the State's agreement not to seek 
aggravating circumstances-something Booth was never subject to in the first place. 
Lastly, Booth filed an affjdavit in support of his petition for post-conviction relief, 
wherein he stated that, 
I pied guilty to First Degree Murder only after my attorney Richard Harris 
threatened me with a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted on going to trial. Mr. Harris 
told me that the judge had told him that he would give the jury a special verdict 
form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. Harris told me as well as my family 
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that the jury would find an aggravating factor and that the Court would then be 
bound to sentence me to a fixed life sentence. 
I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not intentionally shoot the victim. I 
never wanted to plead guilty to the charge. I only plead [sic] guilty because Mr. 
Hanis told me I would get a Fixed Life Sentence and that the Judge would be 
bound to give it to me and if I plead [sic] guilty I would only get I 0 years. 
When asked at the evidentiary hearing what had convinced him to plead guilty, Booth responded, 
"[t]he fact that my attorney, the person who represented me, Richard Harris, repeatedly told me 
that ifI did take this to trial, there is a huge chance that I would do life in prison .... I would die in 
prison." Based on this evidence, the district court did not err in determining that but for Harris' 
error, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 
The State's arguments on appeal fail for several reasons. First, the State misstates the law 
when arguing that "even if Booth would have insisted on going to trial in the hopes of obtaining 
a conviction on second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder, Booth would have faced 
the same potential penalty he believed he was subject to when he pled guilty to first-degree 
murder, i.e., up to life with a minimum of ten years fixed." Contrary to the State's assertiOn, the 
potential penalty for first:-degree murder differs significantly from the potential penalty for 
second-degree murder. Under LC. § 18-4004, second-degree murder is "punishable by 
imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may extend to life." LC. § 18-
4004. In contrast, following a conviction for first-degree murder, in cases where the death 
penalty is not sought, the court is required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with a 
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten years. LC. § I 8-4004. In other words, a 
defendant convicted of first-degree murder automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence 
with a fixed term often years, while a defendant convicted of second-degree murder only faces a 
fixed term of ten years, with an undefined indeterminate term. Therefore, the State en-oneously 
argues that Booth would have faced the same potential penalty if he were convicted of second-
degree murder after trial. 
More importaiJtly, the State's arguments demonstrate a ftmdamental misunderstanding of 
the law as it relates to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The State's ·arguments focus on 
the fact that Booth has not demonstrated that the outcome of his case, specifically, his sentence, 
would have been any different if he went to trial. However, in this context, the relevant inquiry is 
13 
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whether, but for Harris' errors, Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. As this Court has previously noted, the 
focus is "on the defendant's state of mind when choosing to plead guilty," and there is no 
requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential sentence for a lesser charged offense 
shou Id the jury con vi ct on that basis at retrial. McKee th, 140 Idaho at 853, I 03 P .3d at 466. Thus, 
the State's arguments fail because they do not address Booth's state of mind when pleading 
guilty or how his state of mind was affected by Harris' erroneous advice. 9 As mentioned above, 
the evidence demonstrates that Booth would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial if were not for Harris' advice regarding the potential of a fixed life sentence. 
IV. 
Conclusion 
The district court did not err in concluding that Booth met his burden of demonstrating 
Harris' performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Therefore, we affirm the 
distriet court's decision to grant Booth's petition for post-conviction relief. 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
9 The State also appears to argue that Booth was not prejudiced because his best option was to plead guilty and 
request leniency from the court based on the victim's mutual involvement in the drug community, his own drug 
addiction at the time of the murder, and his assertion that he acted out of fear for the safety of himself and his 
family. Although the State may be correct that Booth likely benefited by taking responsibility and pleading guilty to 
the crime, such a factor is not relevant in determining whether Booth has met his burden of demonstrating prejudice. 
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, 
The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea-an opportunity to 
withdraw the plea and proceed to trial-imposes its own significant limiting principle. Those who 
collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. 
Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas 
proceeding because ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the 
defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar 
potential downside. 
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1485-86 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefited by pleading 
guilty instead of going to trial is not relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' deficient performance. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 













Case No. CR-00-00260 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR A SPECIFIC 
SENTENCE 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned will call on for hearing the 
Defendant's Motion for a Specific Sentence at the Clearwater County Courthouse, 150 
Michigan Avenue, Orofino, Idaho, on the 28th day of September, 2011, at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard. 
DATED this 13th day of September, 2011. 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR 
A SPECIFIC SENTENCE - 1 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of September, 2011, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing documents was served, by first class mail, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to, or by personally delivering or leaving with a person in charge of the 
office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
f<l Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 883-2290 
By: 
NOTICE OF HEARINU ON MOTION FOR 
A SPECIFIC SENTENCE - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 

















Case No. CR-2000-260 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT 
It is ORDERED that Dale Carter Shackelford be transported from the Idaho 
Correctional Institution in Orofino, Idaho, to the Clearwater County Courthouse for 
his resentencing hearing at 10:00 A.M. on September 28, 2011. 
DATED this 26th day of September 2011. 
~ 
~Y'\{\~ 
J~n R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true 
complete and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER FOR TRANSPORT was transmitted 
by facsimile to: 
D. RAY BARKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
882-7604 
CLEARWATER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 
208-476-7835 
and hand delivered to: 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
and sent by PFD email to: 




IDAHO STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION 
bphillips@idoc.idaho.gov 
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Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-6749 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICl OF THE 
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Case No. CR-00-00260 
Plaintiff, SENTENCING MEMORANDUM 
v. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant. 
The Defendant has filed a Motion for a Specific Sentence which is set for hearing 
at the same time as the sentencing hearing at 10:00 a.m. on September 28, 2011. That 
motion is based on the quote from the Opinion in the case of State v. Booth, a copy of 
which is attached to that motion. The specific quote is as follows: 
"In other words a defendant convicted of first degree murder 
automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a 
fixed term of ten years ... " 
Based on that statement, the Defendant has asked the court to impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment with a fixed term of ten years. The Defendant is asking 
the court to specifically follow the directive of the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Resentencing Memorandum - 1 
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The State on the other hand, has asked the court to impose consecutive 
sentences of fixed life which is the equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole. The imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would be 
contrary to the holding in Booth. Booth was a non-capital case. In Booth, the Supreme 
Court found that the defense counsel was ineffective because he advised Mr. Booth that 
if he went to trial and was convicted of first degree murder, the court could make a 
finding of the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and if it did then the 
court would be required to impose a fixed life sentence. The Court found this to be an 
erroneous interpretation of Idaho Code Section 18-4004. The Court went on to state at 
page 10 of the Opinion as follows: 
"It is clear from the relevant statutes that statutory 
aggravating circumstances can only be sought in a death 
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the death 
penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to trial and was 
convicted of first degree murder, he would have been 
subject to an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten 
years fixed, but not a mandatory fixed life sentence ... " 
Since the state has decided to not seek a death sentence in this case, Mr. Shackelford 
is in the same situation as Mr. Booth and therefore pursuant to the above quote, is 
subject to an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten years fixed. 
In a death penalty case, a Defendant has a constitutional right to have a jury 
make a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before he can be 
sentenced to a fixed life sentence. The State cannot be allowed to circumvent that right 
by declining to seek a death penalty but at the same time seeking a fixed life sentence. 
The State is asking the court to impose a sentence of fixed life without having to prove 
an aggravating circumstance simply by declining to seek a death penalty. Aggravating 
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circumstances can only be sought in a death penalty case. A sentence of fixed life can 
be imposed only on a finding of a statutory aggravating factor. Therefore the court 
cannot impose a sentence of fixed life in this case but can only impose an indeterminate 
life sentence with at least ten years fixed. However, the Idaho Supreme Court in Booth 
has further limited the permissible sentence with the first quote stated above which says 
that a Defendant convicted of first degree murder automatically receives an 
indeterminate sentence with a fixed term of ten years. The defense contends that, 
based on that quote, the court shall impose a sentence of 10 years fixed with an 
indeterminate term of life. In the alternative, if the court elects to not follow the directive 
of the Idaho Supreme Court as stated in that quote, then the sentence must be an 
indeterminate term of life with a fixed term of not less than 10 years. 
In the original trial there was evidence submitted that Donna Fontaine was killed 
as a result of a gunshot wound to the back of the neck. In argument during the trial, the 
prosecuting attorney characterized the event as an execution. At that time, the defense 
was without sufficient information to contest either the evidence or the characterization 
given by the prosecutor. Subsequent to the trial, new evidence was obtained in the 
post-conviction relief proceeding which refutes both the evidence and the 
characterization. It was discovered that only about two-thirds of the bullet was found in 
the victim's neck and the other one-third was· simply missing. Please find attached 
hereto and, designated as Exhibit A, an Affidavit of Doctor Roderick Saxey, dated May 
5, 2005. Dr. Saxey reviewed the radiographs of the victim and determined that the 
bullet in the neck region was deformed and appeared to have been sheared off and no 
smaller fragments were in the region. He concluded that it was unlikely that the 
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deformity could have occurred in the cervical spine without substantial damage to the 
vertebrae or fragmentation (neither of which occurred) and he concluded that the 
deformity may have been caused by a ricochet off a hard object prior to entry into the 
body. A ricochet is totally inconsistent with an execution and the lack of damage to the 
vertebrae puts into question whether the gunshot wound was the cause of death. It 
should also be pointed out that the radiographs (x-rays) which Dr. Saxey examined 
were withheld from the defense in the discovery process. Had they been provided by 
the defense this matter would have been raised at trial. Please see attached hereto 
and, designated as Exhibit B, the Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief which, at pages two through five, provides additional information 
regarding the x-rays. 
For purposes of this resentencing, the defense submits that there is no evidence 
of an execution and, that the evidence, had it been provided to the defense, would have 
refuted the characterization made by the State. 
In prior proceeding, Dale has been criticized for being manipulative and for being 
inclined to use violence. 
There are two entries from the records of the Larue D. Carter Memorial Hospital, 
a children's home in which he resided when he was nine years old, which relate to 
those characteristics. The first is from a Treatment Review dated February 23, 1971, 
which is attached hereto and designated as Exhibit C. It contains the following 
statement: 
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"Efforts shall continue in the direction of 
increasing self-esteem, using verbalization to 
express appropriate anger, learning to share 
people and things, and trying, and trying to 
teach him to manipulate more effectively." 
[Emphasis added]. 
The second record is from the same facility and is under the title Nurse Notes 
and is attached hereto and designated as Exhibit D. It states as follows: 
"Much aggressive play w/ Mark. Was 
permitted to hit Kevin who was constantly 
provoking Dale. Dale misunderstood and 
kicked Kevin in the stomach. Dale was told 
that if he plans to fight in the future, he must 
use his bare hands." 
These two entries show that at a very young age, Dales was taught to 
manipulate and to use violence. The very characterization which are the basis of 
criticism today were fostered and encouraged by these who provided his daily care after 
his parents had abandoned him. This is not presented as a justification, but as an 
explanation and as a basis for understanding. 
The defense requests that the Court impose a sentence of indeterminate life with 
a fixed term of 10 years consistent with the Booth Opinion. If the court declines to do so 
then, in the alternative, the defense would request a fixed term of confinement, which 
would allow Mr. Shackelford a reasonable expectation of being eligible for parole while 
he is young enough to be able to support himself. It is being asked that Mr. 
Shackelford's future be placed within the control of the parole board and that the rest of 
his life not be cast in stone. 
DATED this g 71'1 day of Septemb~~ 
D. Ray rker 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;J 7th day of September, 2011, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 





[ ] Facsimile 
f)£µ1~~ 
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Affidavit 
J, Roderick Saxey, MD, based on radiographs submitted to me for review~ do solemnly 
affirm the following: 
1. The bullet seen as a metallic foreign body on tadiographs of Victim A, in the r.egio.n of 
the neck, is deformed and appears to have been sheared off. No smaller bullet :fragr.oents 
are in this region. 
2. It is unlikely that this deformity could have occun:ed in the cervical spine without 
substantial damage to the vertebrae or fragmentation of the bullet. 
3. The cause of the deformity and shearing is not evident on the radiographs and may 
have been caused by ricochet off a hard object prior to en:l:r.y into the body. 
, ~CtJ ~ 
Roderick Saxe;~ l\/JJ 
.DATE.Dthis 
RI.BED AND SWORN to before me this.;;;;-day of . J7k¢1. == , 2005. 
t;._,.t_/ . ' 0 
,/JJ;L'W.al"-.4""""(!,___ 
Notary Public :ror Washington 
' ,// 
Residing at: '';--;;.~d  
My commission Expires: ,!/-/.,;}-:;di 
Exhibit A 
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REASON' FOR CONFERENCE: 
Routine Treatment Review 
DATE OF ADMISSION : 9-24-70 





_Cheating, lying, stealing, declining school performance, sexual pre-occupation, aggressive 
acting out hostility toward sibs and peers. 
SUMMARY OF FAMILY PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: 
Dale is the oldest of six children in the home. The other five are his, hers,and ours • 
. Dale 1 s natural parents were divorced when he was 4 and from then. until he was 7 lie lived 
with his mother in what sounds like a, completely chaotic and unpredictable enviornment. 
Since father regained custody and another mother figure was introduced it appears that 
the patient 1 s adjustment has constantly deteriorated. Probably the_ pricipi tating event 
f'or ultimate decompensation ·was birth of half:--brother in August 1969. Without a source_ 
of emotional gratification·, an appropr:i,ate masculine f'igure to identify 1rtlth·, an inconsis-
tent enviornment to confyse him,Dale regressed to a depressed,.-impulse ridden, pre-
psychotic boy. · 
INDIVJ])UAL PSYCHOTHERAPY: 
· Dale was picked up after his .previous therapist ·left in January. He has been se·en twice 
a week since then a total of 14 sessions. Ue ha9 re~ated to the therapist in a warm 
and compliant manner and has been llultra co-ope1~ative 11 • He is able to talk about his 
anger at having to share his father with anyone especially step-mother, his anger and 
. frustration at what seems a dual set of rules fro him· (when father is in t:P.e home and 
when he is not, ·and his sense of complete fear of. abandonment by anyone and everyone 
who he likes. His very good manners and his. degree· o:f co-operation seem to be aJ.most 
a counter-phobic mechanism. He tries very hard to please when he knows the lim.i.ts and 
rules. He is very proud of any eviden_c~ of reward i.e. a pass; a trip to the snak bar 
etc. He has very ambi va1ent feelings about his parents and whether or not he returns 
to them is questionable. Recently there has been efforts at manipulating the therapi::;t. 
against other authority figui'es. The patient shows. promise of being able to learn effec-
tive ~anipulative tec:hniques. Efforts shall continue in the direction of increasing 
self esteem, using verbalization to express appropriate. anger, learning to share people 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: September 28, 2011 




Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording in Orofino 488-1 
Time: 10:32 A.M. 
Case No. CR-2000-00260 
APPEARANCES: 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 










Subject of Proceedings: 
Defendant present with counsel, 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID 
RESENTENCING HEARING 
Prior to convening, Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones, was 
marked. 
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for a resentencing hearing 
on Counts I and II of the Indictment in this case following remand from the Supreme 
Court, Court noted the presence of counsel and the defendant. 
Court reviewed the prior proceedings conducted in this case, including the charge 
of Murder in the First Degree and the maximum penalty prescribed by law. 
Mr. Barker had no oral argument in support of defendant's Motion for a Specific 
Sentence, but relied on his written submissions in support of the motion. Mr. Thompson 
argued in opposition to the defendant's motion. For reasons articulated on the record, 
Court rejected the defendant's position on sentencing, denying the motion and finding 
that the maximum penalty for the chm·ge in each of the two counts before the Court at this 
hearing, Murder in the First Degree, is not less than ten years nor more than life in the state 
penitentiary. 
Court stated that an Update to the Presentence Report had been received and 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
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reviewed by the Court, inquiring if counsel had received a copy thereof and had 
opportunity to review the same, to which both responded in the affirmative, Mr. Barker 
stating that he had sufficient opportunity to review the Presentence Report with the 
defendant. Mr. Barker had nothing to offer by way of rebuttal or in explanation of the 
information contained in the Addendum to the Presentence Report, other than what he 
had already submitted in writing. 
No victim(s) appeared to make an under oath statement as provided by§ 19-5306, 
Idaho Code. Mr. Thompson referred the Court back to the aggravation testimony from 
the original sentencing proceedings and the letter from Shanna Hathman, victim Dom1a 
Fontaine's, daughter, which was filed as an addendum to the Update to the Presentence 
Report. Court was at ease for a few moments to review the letter. 
Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones, was identified, offered and 
admitted into evidence without objection. Court was at ease to read the letter. 
Jerald Miller was called, sworn and testified for the defendant via telephone. No 
cross examination. 
Jackye Squire-Leonard was called, sworn and testified for the defendant. Cross 
examination by Mr. Thompson. No redirect examination. There being no objection from 
counsel, the witness was excused. 
Defendant made an unsworn statement to the Court regarding the DOR' s listed in 
the Update to the Presentence Report. 
In response to inquiry from the Court, the State had no testimony or other evidence 
to present in aggravation of punishment. 
Mr. Barker directed statements to the Court in mitigation of and in recommendation 
of punishment. 
Defendant made a statement to the Court in his own behalf. 
Mr. Thompson directed statements to the Court in aggravation of and in 
recommendation of punishment. 
Court asked if the defendant had any lawful cause to show why judgment should 
not be pronounced against him. Mr. Barker replied, stating that no such lawful cause 
existed. 
Terry Odenborg 
· Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
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Based upon the finding of guilt of the defendant by a jury, Court found the 
defendant guilty of the felony offense of Murder in the First Degree of Donna Fontaine as 
charged in Count I of the Indictment on file in this case and ordered that he stand 
convicted thereof. Court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board 
of Correction for a fixed life term. 
Based upon the finding of guilt of the defendant by a jury, Court found the 
defendant guilty of the felony offense of Murder in the First Degree of Fred Palahniuk as 
charged in Count II of the Indictment on file in this case and ordered that he stand 
convicted thereof. Court sentenced the defendant to the custody of the Idaho State Board 
of Correction for a fixed life term, to run consecutive to the sentence in Count I. 
Court informed defendant of his right to appeal. 
Defendant was remanded to the custody of the Clearwater County Sheriff pending 
delivery to an authorized agent of the Idaho State Board of Correction for execution of 
sentence. 
Court recessed at 11:41A.M. 
Terry Odenborg 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - 3 
APPROVED BY: 
~~ 
JOHN R. STEGNER 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
John R. Stegner 
District Judge 
Date: September 28, 2011 
. STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant. 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 











Sheryl L. Engler 
Court Reporter 
Recording in Orofino 488-1 
Time: 10:32 AM . 
Case No. CR-2000-00260 
APPEARANCES: 
William W. Thompson, Jr., Prosecutor 
Appearing on behalf of the State 
Defendant not present, represented by 
D. Ray Barker, Moscow, ID 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject of Proceedings: RESENTENCING HEARING 
EXHIBITS 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS: 
Defendant's Exhibit A, undated letter from Misti Jones-in evidence 09-28-2011 
WITNESSES 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
Jerald Miller 
J ackye Squire-Leonard 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
















Case No. CR-00-00260 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 
ON RESENTENCING - · 
COUNTS I AND II 
On the 28th day of September, 2011, the defendant, DALE CARTER 
SHACKELFORD, defendant's counsel, D. Ray Barker, and the State's attorney, William W. 
Thompson, Jr., appeared before this Court for resentencing on Counts I and II of the 
Amended Indictment filed herein. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -1-
2 
'144 
On December 22, 2000, a jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of the 
following felony offenses: Count I - MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-
4001, 4003, committed on or about the 29th day of May, 1999; Count II - MURDER IN THE 
FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, committed on or about the 29th day of May, 
1999; Count III - ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-802, committed on or 
about the 29th day of May, 1999; Count IV -CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER IN 
THE FIRST DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, 18-1701, committed on or about the 25th to 
29th days of May, 1999; CountV - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ARSON IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE, Idaho Code 18-802, 18-1701, committed on or about the 25th to 29th days of May, 
1999; and Count VI - PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE, Idaho Code 18-2602, committed 
during a period of time between August, 1999, and January 24, 2000; FELONIES IN A 
TOTAL OF SIX(6) COUNTS. 
On October 25, 2001, the following sentences were imposed: Count I- Death; Count 
II - Death; Count III - commitment to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for 
a fixed period of twenty-five (25) years; Count IV - commitment to the custody of the Idaho 
State Board of Correction for a fixed period of life; Count V - commitment to the custody of 
the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of twenty-five (25) years; Count VI -
commitment to the custody of th~ Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of five 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -2-
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(5) years. 
Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, in its Substitute 
Opinion dated June 1, 2010, the District Court's grant of post-conviction relief, which set 
aside the sentences imposed in Counts I and II on October 25, 2001, was upheld and the 
case was remanded to the District Court for resentencing on Counts I and II. . The 
convictions on all six (6) counts were upheld as were the sentences on Counts III, IV, V and 
VI. 
The Court, having considered the update to Presentence Investigation Report filed 
herein, the evidence, if any, of circumstances in aggravation and in mitigation of 
punishment, the arguments of counsel and any statement of the defendant, thereupon 
asked the defendant if there was any legal cause to show why judgment should not be 
pronounced at this time to which defendant replied that there was none. 
Good cause appearing, 
The Court finds ~hatthe said defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, having 
been found guilty of the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of Idaho 
Code 18-4001, 4003, a felony, as stated in Count I of the Amended Indictment is hereby is 
committed to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed period of LIFE. 
The Court further finds that the said defendant, DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -3-
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having been found guilty of the crime of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, in violation of 
Idaho Code 18-4001, 4003, a felony, as stated in Count II of the Amended Indictment, is 
hereby is committed to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a fixed 
period of LIFE. 
PROVIDED FURTHER, the sentences imposed above shall all run consecutively 
with each other and with the sentences previously imposed in Counts III, IV, V and VI. 
The defendant shall receive credit against such sentences for time served in the 
amount of four thousand two hundred forty five (4,245) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court, Latah County, deliver two 
(2) certified copies of the JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION to the Sheriff of Latah County, 
one to serve as a commitment of the defendant to the Idaho State Board of Correction, and 
one to be delivered by the Sheriff of Latah County to the appointed agents of the Idaho 
State Board of Correction when the defendant is delivered to such agents' custody. 
DATED this h ~ayof 0(....ft>lx/ 2011,nuncprotunctoSeptember28,2011. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -4-
J~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 
47 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II were 
delivered to the following as indicated: 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9048 
Moscow, ID 83843 
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Karen Johnson, Records 
Latah County Sheriff's Office 
Latah County Courthouse 
. Moscow, ID 83843 
Lt. Ron Manell 
Latah County Jail 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Idaho DOC - Central Records 
E-mail: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
Idaho DOC- Dist 2 Probation & Parole 
E-mail: Dist2@idoc.idaho.gov 
~.S.Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[]Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[]U.S. Mail 




[ ] Overnight Mail 
[]Fax 
:)4: Hand Delivery 
[]U.S. Mail 





Idaho DOC - CCD Sentencing Team ~Mail 
E-mail: CCDSentencingD2@idoc.idaho.gov 
on this Co~ay of O~r , 20Jl_. 
SUSAN PETERSEN 
Latah County Clerk of the Court . 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ON 
RESENTENCING - COUNTS I AND II: Page -5-






L. Ci.' ,!L 1 ·1' D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
fYtt/ ]EPli 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 













TO: CLERK OF THE COURT 
Case No. CR-00-00260 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY 
WILLIAM THOMPSON, JR. 
PO BOX 8068 
MOSCOW, IE> 83843 
TO: LAWRENCE WASDEN, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant Dale C. Shackelford, appeals against the 
above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment and 
Conviction on Resentencing- Counts I and II entered in the above-entitled action on 
September 28, 2011, the Honorable Judge John R. Stegner presiding. 
Notice of Appeal - 1 
14~ 
2. Defendant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
judgment described in paragraph I above is an appealable judgment under and 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 11(c)(1)(6). 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues which the appellant may assert on 
appeal is as follows: 
4. 
a. Appellant appeals the sentence imposed in this matter; 
b. Appellant appeals the denial of the Motion to Disqualify Judge 
Without Cause 
c. Appellant appeals the denial of the Defendant's Motion for 
Disqualification of Judge for Cause 
d. Appellant appeals the denial of the Motion for a Specific Sentence. 
e. The District Judge erred by imposing an excessive sentence in this 
matter. 
f. The District Judge erred by making findings based on testimonial 
hearsay from the Presentence Report. 
a. A reporter's transcript is requested; 
b. Transcripts of the following hearings or proceedings are requested: 
Hearing on June 20, 2011 with Court Reporter Sheryl 
Engler present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated at two 
pages. 
Hearing on July 1, 2011 with Court Reporter Sheryl Engler 
present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated at two pages. 
Notice of Appeal - 2 150 •• 
Hearing on August 26, 2011, with Court Reporter Sheryl 
Engler present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated to be three 
pages. 
Hearing on September 28, 2011, with Court Reporter Sheryl 
Engler present. Transcript for this hearing is estimated to be six 
pages. 
5. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: 
NONE 
6. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal was served on the Court 
Reporter; 
b. That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript 
fee because Appellant is indigent, without funds, and the 
undersigned counsel has been appointed to represent the 
Defendant. 
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to I.AR. 20 and the Attorney General of the State of 
Idaho. 
DATED this 2.Dflt day of r{).,,ffJ b6-...- I 2011. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
[)~ D. RaYBfKet= 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2!Jfh day of tJcfn tfZ..,,.- , 2011, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
kl Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
P<J First-class mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
Court Reporter Sheryl Engler at her box at the Latah County Courthouse 
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D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 













Case No. CR-00-00260 
MOTION TO APPOINT STATE 
APPELLANT PUBLIC DEFENDER 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Dale C. Shackleford, by and through his attorney 
of record, D. Ray Barker, and hereby moves the Court to appoint the Office of the State 
Appellate Public Defender to represent the above-named Defendant in the pending 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals. This motion is based on Mr. 
Shackelford's indigency and records and files of this case. 
DATED this }{0£ day of -~&~c~-t~tP~b~""~,...----' 2011. 
Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2C> {4 day of {!,,f:'"'f f!J /Je.,,--- , 2011, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
l><J Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
N First-class mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
[><J First-class mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
D. Ray/Barker 
Attorney at Law 
Motion to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender - 2 154 
D. RAY BARKER 
Attorney at Law 
204 East First Street 
P.O. Box 9408 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0118 
(208) 882-67 49 
Idaho State Bar No. 1380 
· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 













Case No. CR-00-00260 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
After reviewing the records and files herein and after considering the Motion to 
Appoint State Appellate Public Defender and being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender 
is appointed to represent the above-named Defendant in the pending appeal to the 
Idaho Supreme Court/Court of Appeals; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that D. Ray Barker shall continue to represent the 
above-named Defendant in all other aspects of this case, subject to further order of this 
Court. 
2 I )t' 
DATED this . day of 
Order Appointing State 
Appellate Public Defender - 1 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of ()c~ , 2011, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document was served, by first class mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to, or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person in 
charge of the office of or serving by facsimile to the following: 
William W. Thompson 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ ] First-class mail 
)K' Hand-delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3050 Lake Harbor Lane 







Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
;rf-- First-class mail 
[ ] Hand-delivered 
[] Facsimile 
D. Ray Barker 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 9408 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 












Supreme Court No. 39398-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
RE: EXHIBITS 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
Transcript of the Status Conference held on June 20, 2011, the Transcript of the Status 
Conference held on July 1, 2011, the Transcript of the Motion to Disqualify held on 
August 26, 2011, the Transcript of the Resentencing Hearing held on September 28, 2011, 
the Update to the Presentence Investigation Dated March 6, 2001, and the Addendum to 
the Updated Presentence Investigation Dated August 4, 2011, will be lodged with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Appellate Rules and will be lodged as 
exhibit as provided by Rule 31(a)(3), IAR. 
. IN WITNESS WHERE<?F, I e;~ave hereunt°J set m:y hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this I .J day of,~1~ JJLJJ/1 A ~.c , 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 














DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
~~~~~~~~-) 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that the 
clerk's record in the above entitled cause and will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Moscow, Idaho this 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 












Supreme Court Case No. 39398-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Ranae Converse, Deputy Court Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Latah, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by United 




BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE, ID. 83703 
IN WITNE.SS ~EREOF, J haye,.~~r;'!nto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Moscow, Idaho this / Y day of ''1 J?}Ylu lUU.J , 20 -1-- I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Susan R. Petersen, Clerk of the 
District Court, Latah County, ID 
Deputy Clerk 
159 
